Navy’s prized catch snatched away by SLMM
A Sri Lanka Navy patrol craft deployed for port security near the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Eastern Naval Area headquarters, had an unusual encounter on May 8. After noticing the suspicious movement of a fibre glass dinghy within the restricted high security zone, meant to protect the Port and the Naval installation, they gave chase. Some 20 minutes later, they apprehended the boat which was trying to evade detection, some 1.6 nautical miles off the Flag Staff Point.
It was a Sea Tiger boat. On board were Ranjan, described as a Tiger guerrilla expert on radar equipment. His two colleagues were Ramanan and Wan Mukilan. There was one 40 litre explosive can, three bicycles and a communications set. The detection came in a week when Tiger guerrilla recruitment and training in the Trincomalee district were apace. It was only last Saturday the latest batch of recruits "passed out" at a ceremony in Mutur.
It was just days ahead of Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson's meeting with Tiger guerrilla leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, to invite him to return to the peace talks and the aid donor meeting in Tokyo. It transpired that the Sea Tiger boat with warlike material had intruded into the restricted zone encompassing the Port - a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2001. That is besides a violation of the laws of the land.
Navy's Deputy Commander for Eastern Naval Area, Commodore S.R. Samaratunga, has said in a report to the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, that his men who intercepted the boat had performed their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity by arresting the boat. See box story on this page for the full report.
But the hours that followed the Navy detection appears to have changed fact into fiction. Telephones at the Political Offices of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were busy. They were moving heaven and earth with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to get the issue sorted out. The SLMM, in turn, were busy contacting the Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (in the Prime Minister's office) and the Navy.
The Sunday Times learnt that the Navy resisted several insidious pressure moves, some from top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence, to suppress the matter. They wanted the Navy not to proceed with any further action. Among other players in this exercise, to bend forwards and backwards to please the LTTE, were some top personalities in the UNF Government and a highly influential non Sri Lankan.
In their determination to uphold the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the normal laws of the land, the Navy continued to resist. But, alas they were told they would have to heed an SLMM determination that was being issued later that day (May 8). The determination came from retired Norwegian Major General Tryggve Tellefsen, Head of the SLMM. In his one page report, he declared "This morning the SL Navy intercepted a fishing boat manned by three (3) LTTE cadres. SLMM Naval Monitoring Team in Trincomalee was informed by the Navy, and brought to the scene around 1245 pm." See box story on this page for Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's full report.
Maj. Gen.(retd.) Tellefsen asserts in this report that "SLMM negotiated a workable and fair solution" based on facts. In his four point determination he says:
It is not clear how Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's "workable and fair solution" determine that the boat apprehended by the Navy patrol was a "fishing boat." There is no evidence whatsoever from the Navy, the SLMM monitors who came on board later or from any other quarter to confirm this assertion. It is common sense that the Sea Tigers do not engage in fishing, Moreover, besides the explosive can and the communications set, there were no fishing nets or other equipment to suggest that it was a "fishing boat." It was, quite clearly, a boat used by Sea Tigers for their illegal operations at sea.
By his own admission, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's offer that the SLMM is "willing to witness in court of law that the LTTE boat was carrying explosives, and to provide evidence to support any investigation of this incident" is indeed interesting. The question arises whether such evidence in a court of law would speak of the fact that the boat used was a "fishing boat ?" One need hardly consult any dictionary. Even to the most dim witted, it is clear that a "fishing boat" is one used for fishing. Is one to believe that the Sea Tiger craft intruded into the restricted zone whilst the guerrilla cadres went fishing ?
Little wonder Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, was angry about Maj. Gen. (retd.) Tellefsen's "workable and fair solution." In falling in line with the SLMM's determination, he had made clear that he was compelled to accept it under protest. Pointing out that the SLMM act exceeds "the mandate of the SLMM" Vice Admiral Sandagiri has warned in a letter to Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, that "determinations of this nature by SLMM would not be any longer acceptable to the members of the SLN and to the country in view of their gross contradiction and disregard for the real situation."
In the letter Vice Admiral Sandagiri did not hide his feelings when he said "it is respectfully observed that the Government of Sri Lanka maintains the status quo without prejudicing national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation."
Like all other concerns expressed by Security Forces top brass, whether this will also fall on the deaf ears of the Defence Ministry’s increasingly insensitive bureaucracy remains the crucial question. It is no secret that they have been voicing deep concern over mounting fears that the nation's vital security interests are being compromised. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate.
Vice Admiral Sandagiri has charged that when "the HOM (head of mission) of the SLMM, stated in his report that the SLN intercepted a fishing boat manned by LTTE, it was a deliberate attempt at establishing misleading information. The reason being that the members of the SLMM themselves witnessed that the boat had neither fishing gear nor fish on board."
He has said that the Navy was "compelled to accept the determination of the SLMM" over the incident under protest despite the following:
"i. The boat with three LTTE cadres was intercepted within the restricted zone in Trincomalee. It was carrying explosives, thus contravening article 1.7 of the MOU.
"ii. The boat was carrying communication equipment onboard which was also a contravention of MOU article 1.7.
"iii. When attempts were made to check the boat, the LTTE cadres, threatened to commit suicide. The article 1.2 (a) of the MOU relevant."
This is what article 1.7 in the Ceasefire Agreement quoted by Vice Admiral Sandagiri says:
"1.7 The Parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other Party."
Dealing with the threat by guerrillas to commit suicide, Vice Admiral Sandagiri quotes provision 1.2 (a) of the Ceasefire Agreement. This is what it says:
"(a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units." See box story on this page for the full text of Vice Admiral Sandagiri's letter to Defence Secretary Austin Fernando.
