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Message: <blockquote data-quote="netlife007" data-source="post: 19701116" data-attributes="member: 79514">‘Revolution’Tired  of the mess and mismanagement of affairs, the 8th of January (2015) arrived as a  moment when the people (especially a considerable section of the Sinhala  constituency) decided to let off some steam. But the resulting change –  inaccurately characterized as a ‘revolution’ – was brought about largely by two  factors, hardly recognized in the commentary that glorifies President Sirisena’s  victory.The  first had to do with the strength and reassurance the anti-Rajapaksa camp  attracted through the serious intervention of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist  forces, such as the JHU and the Pivithuru  Hetak movement – helped by the timely transformation of these groups into  something more national and reformist. This intervention, in turn, was effective  because of a ‘common candidate’ who seemed more presentable to the majority (for  the Tamil people, it was anyway an anti-incumbent vote). To a wider public and  the world at large, change was coming. Beneath the surface, however, there was  another subtle message at work: there were different and more ‘progressive’ ways  in which the Sinhala Buddhist State can be protected. Some in the anti-Rajapaksa  camp may have wanted to abandon the Sinhala-Buddhist project; but that project  had never abandoned the anti-Rajapaksa camp.The  second factor was the popular slogan: ‘yahapalanaya’. Apart from portraying the  Rajapaksa-camp in a negative light, its key advantage was its overbroad  character which was able to please various different constituent groups in  society. It had something for everyone: for the Tamils, for the  Sinhala-Buddhists, for the civil society groups, for some leftists, etc. With  ‘yahapalanaya’, any one of your political fantasies had the potential of being  (at least partially) realizable in the future.Yet,  the ‘yahapalanaya’ myth is also an enduring problem; since it created dreams of  a fantastic world that cannot be realized. It proclaimed a swift end to  corruption and nepotism, tough action against those who had wronged, and  reconciliation between peoples. But the context proved that this was not  possible, especially if the main goal of the new leadership was the prevention  of the return of the Rajapaksas. In constructing the hope of an ideal world, the  new establishment exposed itself to be critiqued and ridiculed in case it failed  to meet the promised high standards of good governance. In short, to win an  election a beautiful promise had to be constructed. But this was also risky: for  frustration was bound to arrive more quickly when grand promises appeared  unrealizable.Furthermore,  the present frustration with the political leadership has much to do with the  image of a depoliticized leader that certain yahapalanaya-activists had come to  develop in their own minds. Having emerged victorious in what was potentially a  life-threatening electoral battle, the new President was now expected to  introduce necessary reforms, abolish the Executive Presidency, forget about his  party, and perhaps retire from politics at the earliest opportunity. (The  President himself sought to suggest initially, that this was the plan).On  the contrary, the task before the new leader was one of serious  power-consolidation, of avoiding the return of the Rajapaksas, of having to  re-engage with his party, and seek to ensure its success at future elections.  Also, the new leader had to avoid looking overly weak before the likes of Ranil  Wickremasinghe and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. In this, the new leader  had to be mindful of another irony underlying his election: the Sinhala majority  was ready to welcome or tolerate a new leader, as long as he resembled something  of the old. Reforming the Presidency was fine; but one had to essentially act  like a Commander-in-Chief.Some  challengesAs  honeymoons end and politics becomes more normal and real, President Sirisena  confronts a staggering array of political challenges which, if mismanaged, would  spell disaster to his stint in power. In seeking to manage them, however, he  would find himself having to displease some of his ardent supporters who had  come to build fantastic hopes around him.Of  the many challenges confronting the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government, one is  the making of a new Constitution. Having started off on a ‘radical’ promise of  facilitating a final and lasting solution to a bitter conflict, the new  government appears to have realized that ultimate success of the proposed new  constitution would principally depend on the retention of the provisions  concerning the ‘unitary state’ and the prominence given to the Buddha  Sasana. In doing so, considerable opposition to the new constitution would  be effectively avoided, making it somewhat more convenient to construct and  present to the people a constitution which, inter alia, abolishes the  Presidency, while introducing a new electoral system, an enhanced fundamental  rights-chapter, and a devolutionary framework which is only a modest improvement  on the 13th Amendment. Never a fulfillment of the desire for federalism of the  Tamil polity, the new constitution and the political leadership would only be  able to promise a more equal and just society where the human rights of all will  be protected.Another  key challenge concerns the re-energized ultra-Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist  forces, such as the BBS (and the new Sinha-Le movement). As has happened  already, President Sirisena is most likely to engage with these groups  (especially the BBS). Non-engagement is not an option; because the success of  non-engagement can only be guaranteed through the brutal and violent suppression  of the monks. Though electorally weak, the BBS represents something more serious  and potent in Lankan society, with its main face, Gnanasara thera, having a cult  following (as witnessed in public), while also attracting much admiration within  the Sangha community. The uncomfortable reality that has emerged given the  developments of the last few years is that the task before any leader is to  prevent the dangers (i.e. harm for minorities) by swift and forceful action,  while continuing to engage with them, and at times seeking to exploit them to  further one’s political agendas. With the incidents in Homagama, a mix of these  different approaches will ensue. This is also because of the likelihood that the  problems of the BBS will also become the problems of the Sangha, with the  problems of the Sangha now being the problems affecting the Sinhala-Buddhists  too.ConclusionIn  2015, President Sirisena appeared to be an illusive, enigmatic, character. He  was often viewed as a leader who, elected by the people (and with considerable  foreign assistance – something that the majority polity is aware of), was  politically closer to the projects of the West and civil society groups. The  political context demanded that he either played such a role or allowed himself  to be interpreted as being such a leader. The politics of 2016 is set to be  different. Striking a more nationalistic tone, President Sirisena will find  himself having to manage competing values and interests of different and more  disgruntled political forces, while also trying to learn from the prominent  mistakes his predecessor made; a difficult task, since mistakes often begin to  appear differently with the passage of time.But  with the return of a re-energized Mahinda Rajapaksa (given the developments  during the past week), President Sirisena would be compelled to take maximum use  of the authoritarian tendencies of his Prime Minister, the commitment of the  likes of Minister Champika Ranawaka, and most importantly, the involvement in  active politics of the establishment’s final trump card: Field Marshal Sarath  Fonseka. If the lesson was not clear for the new leadership, it appears to be  clear now: to defeat the Rajapaksas, it will have to be like the Rajapaksas in  certain ways. Yet, the problems don’t end there. In having to be like the  Rajapaksas, the new leadership will now need to be more open to the vagaries of  life.</blockquote>

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