ඇත්තටම මනස කියා දෙයක් පවතීද ? [ දෙවන කොටස ]
ඇත්තටම මනස කියා දෙයක් පවතීද ? [ දෙවන කොටස ]
Bit by experimental bit, neuro science is morphing our conception of what we are. The weight of evidence now implies that it is the brain, rather than some nonphysical stuff that feels, thinks, and decides.
- excerpt from A Neuro Science Book
I normally support the thesis that the commonsense conception of psychological states is to be thought of as an incorrect theory about both the function and nature of mind. In fact, they claim that the explanation of human behavior in terms of mental phenomena commits us to an ontology that is not sustained by an accomplished neuroscientific model of the mind. Folk psychology that is, the psychology of our commonsense and ordinary way of speaking leads us to believe in the existence of desires, beliefs, fears, intentions, and so on, but such mental states, do not exist as real phenomena. It is possible to claim that when we are speaking of mental phenomena, we are in fact speaking of neurophysiological states, that is, patterns of neuronal firings, as well as functional and computational processes. In this view, the mind is no more and no less than what the brain does, so that neuroscientists will be able to eventually replace the classification and causal generalizations of folk psychology with another classification given in physical terms only. This will prove that there is just one real kind of ontology in the world, the physical one, which is assumed by neuroscience. Similar theoretical reductions or, in this case, eliminations , have already occurred several times in science (e.g., the identification of “temperature” with “mean molecular kinetic energy”), and there is good reason for thinking that the same thing will occur for mental states as well.
According to the current neurophysiological evidences, at least four arguments can be put forward to claim the identity between mental phenomena and physical brain processes. First, both the constitution and origin of human beings seem to be manifestly physical. In other words, humans seem to be purely physical systems whose development is coded and programmed in DNA molecules within the cell nuclei. Second, the origin of each type of animal appears to have a physical nature. Moreover, the theory of evolution and natural selection maintains continuity between all the living organisms and provides sound reasons for considering the nervous system as the fundamental cause of human behavior. Third, there is overwhelming evidence in favor of the neural dependence of mental states. In fact, all mental phenomena appear to be variously affected by brain damage, and this is precisely what we should expect if the identity theory holds true. Fourth, neurosciences are progressing fast and encouragingly gathering findings that show how human behavioral capacities and deficits can be accounted for in terms of specific physical processes occurring in brain structures. In light of these arguments, it claims that the neuroscientific endeavor provides a promising framework within which the identity between mind and brain will be finally proven.
ඇත්තටම මනස කියා දෙයක් පවතීද ? [ දෙවන කොටස ]
Bit by experimental bit, neuro science is morphing our conception of what we are. The weight of evidence now implies that it is the brain, rather than some nonphysical stuff that feels, thinks, and decides.
- excerpt from A Neuro Science Book
I normally support the thesis that the commonsense conception of psychological states is to be thought of as an incorrect theory about both the function and nature of mind. In fact, they claim that the explanation of human behavior in terms of mental phenomena commits us to an ontology that is not sustained by an accomplished neuroscientific model of the mind. Folk psychology that is, the psychology of our commonsense and ordinary way of speaking leads us to believe in the existence of desires, beliefs, fears, intentions, and so on, but such mental states, do not exist as real phenomena. It is possible to claim that when we are speaking of mental phenomena, we are in fact speaking of neurophysiological states, that is, patterns of neuronal firings, as well as functional and computational processes. In this view, the mind is no more and no less than what the brain does, so that neuroscientists will be able to eventually replace the classification and causal generalizations of folk psychology with another classification given in physical terms only. This will prove that there is just one real kind of ontology in the world, the physical one, which is assumed by neuroscience. Similar theoretical reductions or, in this case, eliminations , have already occurred several times in science (e.g., the identification of “temperature” with “mean molecular kinetic energy”), and there is good reason for thinking that the same thing will occur for mental states as well.
According to the current neurophysiological evidences, at least four arguments can be put forward to claim the identity between mental phenomena and physical brain processes. First, both the constitution and origin of human beings seem to be manifestly physical. In other words, humans seem to be purely physical systems whose development is coded and programmed in DNA molecules within the cell nuclei. Second, the origin of each type of animal appears to have a physical nature. Moreover, the theory of evolution and natural selection maintains continuity between all the living organisms and provides sound reasons for considering the nervous system as the fundamental cause of human behavior. Third, there is overwhelming evidence in favor of the neural dependence of mental states. In fact, all mental phenomena appear to be variously affected by brain damage, and this is precisely what we should expect if the identity theory holds true. Fourth, neurosciences are progressing fast and encouragingly gathering findings that show how human behavioral capacities and deficits can be accounted for in terms of specific physical processes occurring in brain structures. In light of these arguments, it claims that the neuroscientific endeavor provides a promising framework within which the identity between mind and brain will be finally proven.
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