A former member of the Irish Republican Army has begun to pontificate on the need for government-LTTE "negotiations" to resolve the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka. He is Martin Mc Guinness now Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland's power sharing devolved government.
Perhaps some NGO 'peaceniks' have got him to make a fool of himself.
"One thing is certain," insists Mc Guinness, as if had made some new discovery, "The resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka can only happen at the negotiating table. Nowhere else"
He is repeating the same hackneyed 'advice' that bogus anti-war crusaders have been offering all these years to successive governments rather than to the LTTE which fired the first shots of conflict every time 'negotiations' broke down – a fact the so-called international community has deliberately ignored.
Mc Guinness is unaware that the term "getting back to the negotiating table" is now a virtual joke for the vast majority of Sri Lanka's citizens who have fully experienced the LTTE's intransigence for the past 25 years and how the Tigers seized every opportunity during so-called peace talks to rearm and regroup.
McGuiness is also unaware that there are vast differences between the Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan conflicts. The latter is essentially a result of Tamil separatism. Even the present U.S. Ambassador in Sri Lanka Robert Blake in an interview with the State-run Sunday Observer admitted that he does not consider the island's crisis an ethnic conflict.
Northern Ireland crisis was first and foremost a religious (Catholic versus Protestant) conflict that dates back several centuries. The Irish Catholics wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the neighbouring Irish Republic which was established in 1937 after a long-drawn out independence war against England. But the Irish Protestants vehemently opposed it and welcomed British troops that arrived in N. Ireland to suppress the IRA insurgency.
The final phase of the Northern Ireland crisis began in 1969 and lasted for three decades. But right through it was a low-intensity conflict that was hardly comparable to the LTTE's vicous terror campaign. Hardly any government – including the neighbouring Irish Republic – gave overt or covert military assistance and moral support to the IRA engage in acts of terrorism in the way the LTTE has been doing for the past 25 years. British forces never faced a monstrous enemy like the Tigers during the 30-year battle with the IRA.
In contrast India nurtured the LTTE and the so-called international community largely treated as the most important representative – if not the sole – of the Tamil community which was terrorised into submission by Prabhakaran who eliminated many of his political rivals among Tamils.
Although there was a time that Irish Americans, Libyans and some communist block countries (during the cold war) gave some weapons and funds to the IRA, this assistance was virtually nothing compared to the opportunity that India and the West gave LTTE to build a Sea Tiger force, to buy light aircraft and heavy artillery and fleets of ships.
Unlike the LTTE, the IRA was never able to establish a de facto State which clamoured for international recognition. The IRA hardly enjoyed international sympathy.
If at all it was only a bit more strong and sophisticated than the JVP when it was terrorising those did not fall in line with its policies in 1988-89.
Before advising Sri Lanka Deputy Minister Mc Guiness should have a proper look at the role of his Sri Lankan counterpart, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan former LTTE cadre and now Chief Minister Eastern Province. He is aware of this ground reality about which Mc Guiness knows hardly anything. Chandranathan has not urged the government to talk to the LTTE of which he knows inside out. Mc Guiness better learn from him what kind of 'peace' LTTE wants.
Perhaps some NGO 'peaceniks' have got him to make a fool of himself.
"One thing is certain," insists Mc Guinness, as if had made some new discovery, "The resolution of the conflict in Sri Lanka can only happen at the negotiating table. Nowhere else"
He is repeating the same hackneyed 'advice' that bogus anti-war crusaders have been offering all these years to successive governments rather than to the LTTE which fired the first shots of conflict every time 'negotiations' broke down – a fact the so-called international community has deliberately ignored.
Mc Guinness is unaware that the term "getting back to the negotiating table" is now a virtual joke for the vast majority of Sri Lanka's citizens who have fully experienced the LTTE's intransigence for the past 25 years and how the Tigers seized every opportunity during so-called peace talks to rearm and regroup.
McGuiness is also unaware that there are vast differences between the Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan conflicts. The latter is essentially a result of Tamil separatism. Even the present U.S. Ambassador in Sri Lanka Robert Blake in an interview with the State-run Sunday Observer admitted that he does not consider the island's crisis an ethnic conflict.
Northern Ireland crisis was first and foremost a religious (Catholic versus Protestant) conflict that dates back several centuries. The Irish Catholics wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the neighbouring Irish Republic which was established in 1937 after a long-drawn out independence war against England. But the Irish Protestants vehemently opposed it and welcomed British troops that arrived in N. Ireland to suppress the IRA insurgency.
The final phase of the Northern Ireland crisis began in 1969 and lasted for three decades. But right through it was a low-intensity conflict that was hardly comparable to the LTTE's vicous terror campaign. Hardly any government – including the neighbouring Irish Republic – gave overt or covert military assistance and moral support to the IRA engage in acts of terrorism in the way the LTTE has been doing for the past 25 years. British forces never faced a monstrous enemy like the Tigers during the 30-year battle with the IRA.
In contrast India nurtured the LTTE and the so-called international community largely treated as the most important representative – if not the sole – of the Tamil community which was terrorised into submission by Prabhakaran who eliminated many of his political rivals among Tamils.
Although there was a time that Irish Americans, Libyans and some communist block countries (during the cold war) gave some weapons and funds to the IRA, this assistance was virtually nothing compared to the opportunity that India and the West gave LTTE to build a Sea Tiger force, to buy light aircraft and heavy artillery and fleets of ships.
Unlike the LTTE, the IRA was never able to establish a de facto State which clamoured for international recognition. The IRA hardly enjoyed international sympathy.
If at all it was only a bit more strong and sophisticated than the JVP when it was terrorising those did not fall in line with its policies in 1988-89.
Before advising Sri Lanka Deputy Minister Mc Guiness should have a proper look at the role of his Sri Lankan counterpart, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan former LTTE cadre and now Chief Minister Eastern Province. He is aware of this ground reality about which Mc Guiness knows hardly anything. Chandranathan has not urged the government to talk to the LTTE of which he knows inside out. Mc Guiness better learn from him what kind of 'peace' LTTE wants.
