Mavil Aru and Muttur: Lessons
Guns fell silent in Muttur after the LTTE retreated to the so-called CFA lines. When the cause of any phenomenon is obviated, as we said on Saturday, the effect ceases automatically. The disastrous military encounter which left hundreds of civilians, many of them women and children, dead or maimed and over twenty thousand others displaced, was the outcome of an LTTE incursion into that eastern township. Unfortunately, there was no adequate international pressure on the outfit to make an early exit. It withdrew as it could no longer withstand the government's military onslaught.
The LTTE yesterday offered to reopen the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru anicut, after a meeting with Norwegian Envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer. The LTTE said it would reopen the anicut on 'humanitarian grounds.' The question is whether it was also on 'humanitarian grounds that it closed the sluice gates and kept the people without water for so many days. Had the LTTE not meddled with that irrigation scheme, on which over 15,000 families are dependent for drinking water and for irrigating about 30,000 acres of paddy fields, many lives could have been spared without letting the water dispute spill over into Muttur. Its offer to lift the water blockade was an indication that it couldn't hold on to the sluice gates. It was, true to form, making a virtue of its adversity by attaching some strings to its offer.
Agreeing to reopen Mavil Aru was a loss of face for the LTTE. But it had no alternative, as its plan went awry. The LTTE obviously didn't anticipate a determined effort by a cooing President Mahinda Rajapakse to wrest control of Mavil Aru or an all out onslaught to clear Muttur. It cannot face a large scale war in the East, which is it its Achilles heel. It may fire heavy guns from a distance but cannot hold and control it from Kilinochchi. It obviously tested the water by taking over Mavil Aru as part of its strategy to consolidate its power in the East vis-`E0-vis Eastern Tigers on the warpath. It wants to rid the strategic locations in the East of the people, save those who are loyal to it.
From Muttur, Trinco beckons, as the LTTE says. Since the CFA was signed, the LTTE has been making preparations to disrupt the naval movements between the North and the East and render the North vulnerable. That is why it moved heavy guns to the areas south of the Trincomalee Harbour, which has now come well within its artillery range. If that sea route could be blocked at Trinco, with stringer missiles or attacks on Palali, the LTTE has the potential to disrupt supplies to Jaffna and cause the troops trapped there to leave for Colombo in ships (which India might offer once again). Therefore, there is much more to the Muttur attacks than what meets the eye.
It was reported, at the time of writing, that government had rejected the LTTE offer as it came with a set of demands such as a troop pull out. The government was hopeful that the troops could reopen the anicut shortly. The LTTE had resumed firing shells.
After restoring the water supply, the government is duty bound to hold an investigation into the allegation that the Tamil civilians in the uncleared areas have been deprived of water and ensure that justice is done. Not even the terrorists should be deprived of water. Let that be the bottom line! Denying water to humans or even animals is a crime, irrespective of who the perpetrator is.
Had the government taken the Mavil Aru closure and Muttur attacks lying down, the LTTE would definitely have spread its tentacles to other irrigation schemes and strategic townships. Or, if the government had opted to negotiate with the LTTE by way of having the sluice gates reopened, talks would have taken a month of Sundays and collapsed predictably in the end with the anicut still shut.
The first sign of an LTTE plan failing is the noise that we hear from Solheim. He usually disappears when the LTTE is on a winning streak. He suddenly appears like a swallow before rain, when his friend Prabhakaran gets into hot water. Last week, we heard him asking both parties to stop fighting. Yes, fighting is bad and it must be avoided. But, when Prabhakaran's soul mate says so, it means that the LTTE is in a bad way.
What, does Solheim think, he is, to ask the democratically elected government of a sovereign state not to respond to a terrorist threat, which endangers the lives of 15,000 families? Does he think he is a viceroy to prevent a government from exercising that legitimate right? What is a state there for if it doesn't defend its citizenry? We have only our own servile politicians to blame for having made a super star of a nowhere man. They must learn from Prabhakaran how to handle such busybodies. He may entertain Solheim as a friend but he doesn't hesitate to give the cold shoulder to Akashis and Bauers. That, we grudgingly grant, is true leadership, albeit for a macabre cause!
There is a lesson that the government ought to learn from what it has experienced during the past two weeks. There are different languages for different animals. The Elephant doesn't understand the language of the bipeds. So do the striped big cats. In dealing with the Tigers, the government must be prepared to speak the language that they do understand.
Guns fell silent in Muttur after the LTTE retreated to the so-called CFA lines. When the cause of any phenomenon is obviated, as we said on Saturday, the effect ceases automatically. The disastrous military encounter which left hundreds of civilians, many of them women and children, dead or maimed and over twenty thousand others displaced, was the outcome of an LTTE incursion into that eastern township. Unfortunately, there was no adequate international pressure on the outfit to make an early exit. It withdrew as it could no longer withstand the government's military onslaught.
The LTTE yesterday offered to reopen the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru anicut, after a meeting with Norwegian Envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer. The LTTE said it would reopen the anicut on 'humanitarian grounds.' The question is whether it was also on 'humanitarian grounds that it closed the sluice gates and kept the people without water for so many days. Had the LTTE not meddled with that irrigation scheme, on which over 15,000 families are dependent for drinking water and for irrigating about 30,000 acres of paddy fields, many lives could have been spared without letting the water dispute spill over into Muttur. Its offer to lift the water blockade was an indication that it couldn't hold on to the sluice gates. It was, true to form, making a virtue of its adversity by attaching some strings to its offer.
Agreeing to reopen Mavil Aru was a loss of face for the LTTE. But it had no alternative, as its plan went awry. The LTTE obviously didn't anticipate a determined effort by a cooing President Mahinda Rajapakse to wrest control of Mavil Aru or an all out onslaught to clear Muttur. It cannot face a large scale war in the East, which is it its Achilles heel. It may fire heavy guns from a distance but cannot hold and control it from Kilinochchi. It obviously tested the water by taking over Mavil Aru as part of its strategy to consolidate its power in the East vis-`E0-vis Eastern Tigers on the warpath. It wants to rid the strategic locations in the East of the people, save those who are loyal to it.
From Muttur, Trinco beckons, as the LTTE says. Since the CFA was signed, the LTTE has been making preparations to disrupt the naval movements between the North and the East and render the North vulnerable. That is why it moved heavy guns to the areas south of the Trincomalee Harbour, which has now come well within its artillery range. If that sea route could be blocked at Trinco, with stringer missiles or attacks on Palali, the LTTE has the potential to disrupt supplies to Jaffna and cause the troops trapped there to leave for Colombo in ships (which India might offer once again). Therefore, there is much more to the Muttur attacks than what meets the eye.
It was reported, at the time of writing, that government had rejected the LTTE offer as it came with a set of demands such as a troop pull out. The government was hopeful that the troops could reopen the anicut shortly. The LTTE had resumed firing shells.
After restoring the water supply, the government is duty bound to hold an investigation into the allegation that the Tamil civilians in the uncleared areas have been deprived of water and ensure that justice is done. Not even the terrorists should be deprived of water. Let that be the bottom line! Denying water to humans or even animals is a crime, irrespective of who the perpetrator is.
Had the government taken the Mavil Aru closure and Muttur attacks lying down, the LTTE would definitely have spread its tentacles to other irrigation schemes and strategic townships. Or, if the government had opted to negotiate with the LTTE by way of having the sluice gates reopened, talks would have taken a month of Sundays and collapsed predictably in the end with the anicut still shut.
The first sign of an LTTE plan failing is the noise that we hear from Solheim. He usually disappears when the LTTE is on a winning streak. He suddenly appears like a swallow before rain, when his friend Prabhakaran gets into hot water. Last week, we heard him asking both parties to stop fighting. Yes, fighting is bad and it must be avoided. But, when Prabhakaran's soul mate says so, it means that the LTTE is in a bad way.
What, does Solheim think, he is, to ask the democratically elected government of a sovereign state not to respond to a terrorist threat, which endangers the lives of 15,000 families? Does he think he is a viceroy to prevent a government from exercising that legitimate right? What is a state there for if it doesn't defend its citizenry? We have only our own servile politicians to blame for having made a super star of a nowhere man. They must learn from Prabhakaran how to handle such busybodies. He may entertain Solheim as a friend but he doesn't hesitate to give the cold shoulder to Akashis and Bauers. That, we grudgingly grant, is true leadership, albeit for a macabre cause!
There is a lesson that the government ought to learn from what it has experienced during the past two weeks. There are different languages for different animals. The Elephant doesn't understand the language of the bipeds. So do the striped big cats. In dealing with the Tigers, the government must be prepared to speak the language that they do understand.
