By D.B.S. JEYARAJ
The ongoing war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been one of fluctuating fortunes with one side or the other gaining and losing ground militarily.
As far as the Tigers were concerned their zenith was in 1999 – 2000 when a series of successful military operations codenamed “Oyatha Alaigal” or ceaseless waves were launched in the Northern mainland of Wanni as well as the Jaffna peninsula.
The greatest military triumph by the LTTE then was the capture of Elephant Pass or “Aanai Iravu” as it is known in Tamil. In a staggered offensive comprising three phases, the LTTE adopted an “encircle and enfeeble” strategy to overcome the armed forces and overrun military installations.
The prized jewel in the Tiger crown of conquest was Elephant Pass. The military balance underwent a dramatic transformation after the LTTE seized the vast military complex in the area around Elephant Pass.
The Elephant Pass isthmus was of strategic importance as it linked the northern mainland known as Wanni with the Jaffna Peninsula. Both the Jaffna-Kandy Road or A-9 Highway, and the railway line to Jaffna run through Elephant Pass, and the narrow strip of land was in a sense the gateway to Jaffna.
The fall of Elephant Pass marked the first time in the history of the "Tamil Eelam war" that the area had come under the LTTE's control.
The Dutch colonialists first built a small fortress in 1776, which was converted in modern times into a Rest House for tourists. After Independence a permanent garrison was set up there to check illicit immigration, smuggling and unlawful transport of timber.
As the intensity of the ethnic conflict escalated, the strategic importance of Elephant Pass also increased. The small camp gradually expanded into a sprawling complex. At one time, the Elephant Pass base and the satellite camps covered an area about 23 km long and 8-10 km wide. To celebrate the capture of Elephant Pass, the LTTE organised a flag-raising ceremony on April 23, 2000.
Hundreds of LTTE cadres and a large number of Tamil civilians who serve as members of an auxiliary force known as "Thunaippadai" watched as the crimson-and-gold LTTE flag was hoisted by 'Colonel' Bhanu.
As Bhanu, stepped back and saluted the flag, LTTE fighters fired ceremonially in the air, with seven artillery field guns firing three shells each. Thereafter, Bhanu addressed the gathering.
In his speech, Bhanu said that Elephant Pass was only the first step in "the war to liberate our homeland" and there would be "many more battles". The valour and sacrifices of the LTTE fighters, he said, had made it possible to realise the "dream of annihilating Aanai Iravu".
The camp, established by the Dutch over 200 years ago, had for long remained "a symbol of alien domination" and divided the Tamil people of the peninsula from the mainland, Bhanu said, and added: "Now it is no more. After we transport all that needs to be removed from here we will raze this place to the ground except for a small structure to remind ourselves of this oppressive symbol. Our enemies will not be allowed to return and occupy this place in the future."
Sweets were then distributed. What followed immediately afterwards was rich in symbolism, and marked a defining moment for the LTTE. Groups of hand-picked civilians and some Tiger cadres in uniform walked along the Elephant Pass causeway on the isthmus that links the Wanni area with the peninsula.
One group walked northwards from the mainland to the peninsula, and another went southwards from the peninsula to the mainland. The significance of this "walk" was that for the first time in living memory there were no barriers or men in khaki to stop the people crossing to and from the peninsula. A perceived “symbol of oppression” had been eradicated.
If Elephant Pass was a crowning achievement for the LTTE its fall was a military nadir for the armed forces. . One year later on April 24 2001 “Operation Agnikheela” was conducted in a bid to wrest Elephant Pass back. It ended in dismal failure.
Then came the Oslo – facilitated peace process and ceasefire. Once military hostilities erupted the re-taking of Elephant Pass was given top priority. Several attempts were made but none of them succeeded mainly due to fierce tiger resistance. The loss of Elephant Pass continues to rankle.
Now the wheel seems to be turning full cycle. The armed forces are on the ascendant in recent times and have notched several significant victories.
Current military developments indicate that the elusive goal of Elephant Pass is within sight.
If the army maintains its current momentum and if extraneous factors do not intrude it appears that Colombo’s writ would run again in Elephant Pass very soon. When the ninth anniversary of the fall of Elephant Pass dawns next year, the gateway to Jaffna will most likely be in the hands of the armed forces.
Early this year when the army and Tigers were fighting in the vicinity of Marudhamadhu or Madhu this columnist wrote an article in “The Bottom Line” of February 27 about the Mannar war theatre.
In that I referred to some objectives of the armed forces and beneficial consequences if successful. Unfolding events have demonstrated the validity of such assertions. Here are some relevant excerpts –
“There are two short - term and two long - term strategic objectives for the armed forces in Mannar.
These fall within the overall aim of establishing full control over the entire Mannar district and then the entire Northern mainland known as Wanni.
The two long - term objectives of the army are to destroy the sea tiger bases in the coastal areas of Vidathaltheevu and Naachikudaa, and to establish full control of the littoral along Mannar - Pooneryn Road.
If and when the armed forces manage to eradicate LTTE sea power off the shores of Mannar district and take over the Mannar - Pooneryn Road and littoral areas several advantages would be gained.
Firstly, the maritime supply route from Tamil Nadu could be restricted if not stopped altogether. Presently the LTTE gets most of its fuel, medicine, dry ration food and materials for explosive devices etc from India.
Secondly, it would be possible to establish a land - based route to the Jaffna peninsula. Transport could be along the Mannar - Pooneryn Road and from there by the short - distance ferry between Sangupiddy and Keratheevu.
Thirdly, Government writ over the Mannar littoral would facilitate off - shore exploration for oil in the Mannar gulf basin.
Fourthly, taking control of Pooneryn can eliminate the threat to Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE artillery battery located in the Kalmunai - Nagathevanthurai areas of Pooneryn. The Tigers are able to target even the Palaly base from Pooneryn.
Fifthly, the armed forces can use Pooneryn as a launching pad for further ground movements into Tiger territory.
If troops move east and reach Paranthan they have three further options.
1) Move further east by south - east along the axis of Paranthan - Mullaitheevu Road;
2) Move up north towards Elephant Pass;
3) Move down south towards Kilinochchi.
If abolishing sea tiger bases in Vidathaltheevu - Naachikudaa and acquiring the Mannar - Pooneryn Road are the two long - term goals the two short - term targets are Adampan and Maruthamadhu known generally as Madhu.
The short term targets of capturing Madhu and Adamban were reached on April 24 and May 8 respectively. As for the two long term objectives the armed forces are on the verge of achieving both.
The 58 division or task force one commanded by Brigadier Shavendra Silva has not only taken Vidathaltheevu but also a number of sea Tiger bases along the western coast of Mannar and Kilinochchi districts.Vidathaltheevu, Padaguthurai, Moondrampiddy, Thevaayanpiddy, Kallikudaah, Naachikudaah, Valaipaadu, Pallikudaah and Peimunai (Devil’s point) are some of these.
The armed forces have also taken a number of places along the A – 32 highway running virtually parallel to the North – western coast. Iluppaikadavai, Vellankulam, Mulangaavil, Pallavaraayankaddu etc are some of these places.
Currently the armed forces are about 7-8 km away from Poonagari, the anglicised version of which is Pooneryn. The tasks at hand for task force - one is to mop up the Valaipaadu – Peimunai region.Thereafter, it has to seize Poonagari and follow it up by taking coastal locations in the 15 km long Pooneryn promontory like Komarimunai (comer point) Kalmunai (Stone point) Kauthaarimunai (Partridge point), Sangupiddy and Nagathevanthurai.
Once these tasks are accomplished the armed forces would have captured all the LTTE sea Tiger bases along the North – western coast. The army would also have taken the 82 km long Northern mainland component of the A – 32 highway from Mannar to Poonagari.
The full length of the A – 32 is calculated as 98 km. This includes the coastal stretch from Mannar to Pooneryn and then the distance to Keratheevu on the peninsula, finally culminating in Navatkuli.
The now defunct ferry between the mainland and peninsula is to and from Sangupiddy on the mainland and Keratheevu on the peninsula. The A – 32 therefore takes into account the distance from Keratheevu to Navatkuli via Thanankilappu and Koyilaakkandy. The A – 32 is described officially as the Mannar – Keratheevu – Navatkuli Road.
Interestingly the short road between Poonagari and Sangupiddy is classified separately as a second class road (AB). The Poonagari – Sangupiddy Road named AB – 30 is 8. 85 km in length.
The 58 division progress has led to eager anticipation of a land route to Jaffna being opened. Recent pronouncements of Army Commander Sarath Fonseka have strengthened this expectation.
Presently the road stretch between Omanthai and Kilinochchi on the central A – 9 highway is nominally under LTTE control. The armed forces dominate areas in close proximity but have refrained from establishing formal control of the road.
There is no prospect at present of re- opening the A – 9 highway. Besides it would be extremely vulnerable even if the army takes over the A – 9 stretch as the LTTE occupies the regions east of the A -9 between Omanthai - Paranthan.
Thus the army’s advances up to Poonagari have opened up the distinct possibility of a new and shorter land based route. The A – 32 from Mannar through Poonagari via the Sangupiddy – Keratheevu ferry to the peninsula can be utilised.
Apart from re-activating the ferry immediately, the army’s sappers can also speedily construct the causeway between Kerateevu – Sangupiddy thus eliminating the water crossing.
The failure of successive Colombo governments to complete the unfinished causeway project known as “Mahadeva Thaambothi” has been a long – felt grievance of the northern Tamils.
If this is done and surface – based transport is made easier, then travelling between Jaffna – Mannar would be easy, short and cheap.
Perhaps the armed forces could embark on this project speedily and win the hearts and minds of the Tamil people. Of course displaced Tamils must be re-settled.
Apart from benefits that could accrue to civilians through establishing another land route to Jaffna (in the future after re- settlement) there is an urgent and imperative need for the armed forces also to expedite such moves as transport to and from Jaffna which is by sea and air now.
While re- activating the Sangupiddy – Keratheevu ferry and facilitating surface transport between the mainland and peninsula is a welcome prospect, the goal of establishing a land route to Jaffna need not depend entirely on this. Other “avenues” are there too.
The swift progress of 58 division has not been restricted to the north – western littoral alone. Task Force – one has made and is making rapidly significant strides in the hinterland too.
Right now soldiers of 58 division are fighting their way through Chemmankundru and trekking along Ponnaaveli marshes in the interior towards the Paranthan – Poonagari Road.
The troops are about 5 – 7km away from the Poonagari – Paranthan Road and it is only a matter of time before they reach their destination.
The west – east road between Poonagari and Paranthan is a third class road categorised by the highways dept as B - grade. It is 25.74 km in length and is officially called B357.
It begins at the Poonagary junction and proceeds eastwards towards Paranthan on the A – 9 highway and intersects near the 161st milepost. Along this route are places like Sinnaparanthan, Paranthannalloor, Kunchuparanthan and Aalankerni.
Militaristically, it does not make sense for the army to “rest” after taking Poonagari and reaching a vantage point on the Poonagary – Paranthan road. Military logic demands that the armed forces continue with their march.
Since the north – western sector is almost under army control the soldiers will have to go eastwards. If and when they reach the B357 or Poonagary – Paranthan Road the armed forces will utilise it as an “axis” and proceed east towards Paranthan.
As stated in these columns earlier the taking of Paranthan on the A – 9 would offer the armed forces three options.
One is to proceed further to the east using the A – 36 or Paranthan – Mullaitheevu Road which is 52. 13 km long; the other is to proceed southwards on the A – 9 towards Kilinochchi which is 4 miles away; the third is to proceed northwards along the A – 9 to Elephant pass , nine miles away.
Though all three options are viable and the armed forces possess the capability to engage simultaneously in all three, there are also three other crucial factors to consider.
Firstly, there is the humanitarian aspect. A large number of the displaced persons are living along the A – 36 or Paranthan – Mullaitheevu Road. Places like Tharmapuram and Viswamadhu are teeming with pathetic, internally displaced persons. Military movement along this axis would exacerbate suffering and human misery.
Secondly, there is the political angle. Kilinochchi is now like a “ghost town” but retains the image of being a de – facto LTTE administrative capital. It was the anticipated capture of Kilinochchi town by the armed forces that triggered off an emotional furore in Tamil Nadu.
The Central and state governments in New Delhi and Chennai have managed with great difficulty to reduce tensions and contain passions. In a situation where the demand for a ceasefire is gathering momentum in Tamil Nadu the capture of “Tamil” Kilinochchi by a “Sinhala” army could prove a potent flashpoint with dire consequences.
Thirdly, there is the military aspect. Earlier attempts to retake Elephant pass were from within the peninsula. Troops broke out from positions along the Kilaly – Eluthumadduvaal – Nagar Kovil axis and moved south. The Tiger defences were to the south of Muhamaalai.
However, the awaited capture of Paranthan transforms the situation. It would be possible for the armed forces to move northwards to the Peninsula from Paranthan using the A – 9 as an axis.
The terrain between Paranthan and Kurinchatheevu adjacent to the Elephant pass isthmus in the north is generally open and flat. The armoured vehicles of the mechanized infantry regiment would find this terrain ideal for swift mobility.
Besides, the region is sparsely populated. Few IDP’s have chosen to move into what is regarded as “unlivable” land. So a humanitarian catastrophe is not likely to happen if the conflict spreads there.
More importantly the Tigers would be at a hopeless disadvantage. The 53 and 55 divisions are facing entrenched tigers in the peninsula. Now the LTTE could be attacked from the rear too.
The army could also target tiger positions with artillery from north and south. It would amount to a virtual pincer movement. The LTTE would have to withdraw or face annihilation.
Against this backdrop the chances of option three or “Elephant Pass Ho” seems the most likely. Given the successful streak of the military and the necessity on the part of the LTTE to safeguard positions east of the A – 9 there is little likelihood of the LTTE resisting intensely or extensively on this front.
Geo - strategically there is little benefit in holding on to Elephant pass in a situation where Paranthan is taken and movement along the A – 9 is restricted and interdicted.
It is however a matter of prestige and Velupillai Prabhakaran may sacrifice many cadres to retain Elephant pass. Whatever the fighting prowess of the tigers Elephant pass is doomed to be a lost battle for the LTTE.
The capture or re-capture of Elephant pass would expedite restoration of a northern land route. It would be a case of proceeding along the Mannar – Poonagari A – 32 and then going on the B357 Poonagari - Paranthan Road and finally travelling on the A – 9 Jaffna – Kandy Road.
Subsequently the entire A – 9 could be re-opened if and when other points on the highway like Puliyankulam, Kanagarayankulam, Mankulam, Kokavil, Thirumurugandy and Kilinochchi are taken.
There is also psychological and propagandistic dimensions. The fall of Elephant pass in 2000 is regarded as a great debacle. The inability of the armed forces to regain it all these years has been a sore point. Retaking it would be sweet revenge indeed!
So if the armed forces are able to regain Elephant pass it would be a tremendous morale booster to the government, armed forces and a vast majority of the people.
The Rajapaksa regime could also derive maximum propaganda mileage out of it. In propagandistic terms the capture of Elephant pass could be projected as being a greater achievement than the fall of Kilinochchi.Only two things could prevent this scenario from taking place. One is the LTTE and the other is our big neighbour.
Are the Tigers capable of resisting and preventing military movement in this direction?
Will the situation in India reach a point where New Delhi is compelled to intervene and enforce a moratorium on further military campaigns?
Such prospects seem unlikely but given realities can anything be ruled out firmly in Sri Lanka?
DM
Heh Heh...
