By K T Rajasingham
Denzil Kobbekaduwa
When President Ranatunge Premadasa formed his new government in September 1989, it was expected that either Lalith Athulathmudali or Gamini Dissanayake, one of the two United National Party (UNP) stalwarts, would be made the new Prime Minister. But, to everyone's surprise, Premadasa appointed the little-known D B Wijetunga and appointed Ranjan Wijeratne - a planter by profession - as the Minister of State for Defense, a portfolio earlier held by Athulathmudali.
But, when Ranjan Wijeratne was assassinated, Srisena Coorey was appointed as the General Secretary of the UNP, the ruling party, the post, Ranjan Wijeratne had held. It was alleged that the appointment was made by Premadasa without him consulting anyone.
Athulathmudali was the Colombo district leader of the UNP, but his position was systematically undermined by the introduction of Srisena Coorey, who was entrusted with the selection of the party candidates to the Colombo Municipality Council. Thus, during the administration of Premadasa, the influence of Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake was progressively diminished.
Thereafter, these two senior members of the party were kept away from negotiations the Government had with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The so-called peace talks between Premadasa and his nominees and the LTTE delegation commenced in April 1989 and went on until the Indian army left the country on March 24, 1990.
By 1990, reports began to emerge that the LTTE was taking control of the areas in the North and Eastern provinces. Gradually, the LTTE began to gain more authority and the police had to obtain permission from the LTTE, even to leave their stations. They spent their time in their barracks, playing games and protecting themselves.
It came to the knowledge of Lalith Athulathmudali, when one Lieutenant Wathiyage contacted him around March 1991, that weapons were being transfered to the LTTE by the army in the Welioya jungles, apparently under the supervision of Colonel Bohoran, who was the head of the army camp at there. He said that he himself had delivered weapons to the LTTE. Wathiyage added that he had stayed in the LTTE camp for some time and that they had invited him to join them.
It was later learnt that Wathiyage, while delivering weapons to the LTTE, removed three T56 assault rifles and took them with him to his camp at Ambepussa, in August 1991, when he was transferred from Welioya. Later, an army officer met Wathiyage at Ambepussa, gave the numbers of the three T56 assault rifles and demanded that they be returned forthwith. Wathiyage was left with no choice, but to return them to the superior army officer. The army took no immediate action against Wathiyage, and he subsequently deserted, for fear of being exterminated by the army.
He then contacted Lalith Athulathmudali, who had helped him earlier in regard to a disciplinary action. He told Athulathmudali of the whole episode regarding the government's transfer of arms to the LTTE.
At this time, Denzil Kobbekaduwa had just returned from the army staff college in England and taken charge in Panagoda. He was popular among the Sinhalese and had been sent to the Royal College of Defense Studies in the United Kingdom, in January 1989, on a one-year course. But after a month he was recalled and sent to Kandy to deal with the Janata Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP), the Sinhalese insurgents. The British College was disturbed by this so the British High Commission in Colombo intervened and Kobbekaduwa was sent back to the UK to continue training. Subsequently he completed his course and returned to Sri Lanka.
On his return, he was attached to 1 Division, Panagoda from January 1990. On June 12, 1990 he was sent to Ampara for Eelam War 2. In July 1990, he was promoted to Major General and took over as commander of the Northern headquarters based in Anuradhapura.
In the meantime, Athulathmudali contacted Kobbekaduwa and he also met Wathiyage in Athulathmudali's house. Kobbekaduwa made discreet inquiries about the transfer of weapons to the LTTE and Gamini Dissanayake, too, joined them in getting to the bottom of the transfer of weapons. It became evident that, Athulathmudali and Kobbekaduwa were collecting evidence and making plans to expose President Ranatunge Premadasa for arming the enemy, before an international tribunal.
On March 24, 1990, the Indian army had left Sri Lanka and the LTTE managed to destroy the Tamil National Army (TNA), which was the creation of the Indian RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and that of Varatharajah Perumal, the Chief Minister of the North East Provincial Council. The LTTE took control of the Eastern province and after June 11, 1991, it was alleged that the LTTE used weapons given by Premadasa, to kill hundreds of police officers in the Eastern province.
Meanwhile, Kobbekaduwa was called in and within two weeks he was able reopen police stations in the Eastern province. Thereafter, he took over the command of Trincomalee and virtually took over as the Commander of the Northern forces, with headquarters in Anuradhapura.
Meanwhile, Athulathmudali and Kobbekaduwa were gathering facts and the information about the transfer of weapons and Gamini Dissanayake and G M Premachandra also joined in their endeavor, in March 1991. It was alleged that one Tilak Shantha, a security guard of Lalith Athulathmudali, and army private De Silva, who was supposed to be the confidante of Denzil Kobbekaduwa since 1985, had became the eyes and ears of Premadasa.
The dismissed UNP members - over the failed attempt to impeach the President - organized a new political party, the Democratic United National Front (DUNF), and Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake were made joint Presidents.
Meanwhile, Premadasa began to take steps to check on the growing popularity of Denzil Kobbekaduwa. During the siege of Jaffna Fort by the LTTE, Kobbekaduwa began an operation to relieve the siege. He submitted his plans to the army headquarters for approval. It was said that, the very evening before the proposed operation was to take place, the Observer newspaper, one of the Government-controlled English evening dailies, carried his plans for relieving the Fort. There had been a deliberate leak to ridicule and obstruct Kobbekaduwa.
On July 10, 1991, the LTTE launched a massive attack at Elephant Pass. The army base commanded by Major Sanath Karunaratne defended the camp. The battle for Elephant Pass was the most violent and bloody confrontation that ever took place between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces.
According to Adele Ann Balasingham, "For the LTTE, the Elephant Pass was a 'thorn in the neck of the Tamil Eelam', which had to be removed surgically for the physical well-being of the homeland. Since the war broke out, the LTTE fighters slowly and systematically strengthened the defense sentry positions in the northern and southern sectors of the base to prevent any offensive thrust by the Sri Lankan troops. Several attempts made by the army to break through the siege were successfully thwarted by the LTTE fighters. On the beginning of July 1991, the LTTE moved anti-aircraft guns in close proximity to the base and cut off the helicopter-borne supplies. A full fledged siege was imposed and the entire contingent of troops stationed in the base was trapped. On the 10 July 1991, LTTE assembled a massive force, consisting of several commando units of both male and female fighters and launched a major assault on the camp." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers - page 85.
Elephant Pass occupied a strategic position linking Jaffna Peninsula to the rest of the Northern mainland, the isthmus geographically shapes itself as the neck of the Tamil region.
It should be remembered that, in July 1990, when Denzil Kobbekaduwa took charge as the officer commanding the North, he instituted an operation codenamed "Operation Gajasinghe" to pull out troops from Kilinochchi and strengthen the camp at Elephant Pass. He also established a temporary camp at Paranthan, north of Paranthan junction, for obtaining fresh water for the camp at Elephant Pass.
Subsequently, Elephant Pass camp was expanded and transformed into a massive military complex, with a main base and four mini-camps, within a stretch of land three miles in diameter. At one time, the Elephant Pass base and the satellite camps covered an area about 23 kilometers long and nearly 10 kilometers wide. About 800 troops manned the military installations.
Since the beginning of Eelam War 2, the A-9 Highway - the Jaffna-Kandy road and railway links, had been cut off by the army to curtail the movements of the LTTE and to maintain a rigorous economic embargo on the population of the Jaffna peninsula.
The blockade subjected ordinary civilians to enormous and untold hardship and they were compelled to trek along the narrow and dangerous Kilali waterways of Elephant Pass lagoon.
The LTTE began its first assault on the evening of July 10, 1991, from the south of Elephant Pass. On the very first day, the LTTE captured a few bunkers held by Sri Lankan troops. The LTTE attacked Elephant Pass base by using steel plated earth moving vehicles and tractors. They fired hundreds of motor rounds on the positions of the armed forces.
On the second day, the second in command of the base, Major Lalith Buddhadasa, was killed, along with a few other soldiers, by mortar attack. Attempts by the Sri Lankan air force to land helicopters inside the base proved futile, due to the heavy gunfire of the Tigers. The LTTE by then had surrounded the army base and were closing in from all direction. The main thrust was from the south and there were attempts to penetrate the defenses with earth moving vehicles and artillery fire on the outer defense positions. But, the army, which fought valiantly, foiled all of the LTTE's attempts. Eventually, the Rest House camp in the southern sector of the base, fell into the hands of the LTTE. Sustaining heavy losses, the Sri Lankan troops fell back to the rear positions.
"Prabhakaran openly declared that, he had waged the 'Mother of all Battles'. He was very confident of victory. Troops were running short of ammunition, food and medicine. Many airdrops were carried out. Fortunately, about 60 percent of the airdrops fell within the camp premises. Troops managed with at least one cooked meal a day. This meal, prepared in different locations, included rice, dhal and either Soya meat or dried sprats." - A Soldier's Version by Major General Sarath Munasinghe - page 115.
Fierce fighting continued for four days and the LTTE forces, both male and female cadres, continued their relentless onslaught on the southern and northern sectors of Elephant Pass despite mounting causalities. The entrapped Sri Lankan soldiers fought for their lives and were completely surrounded. It was reported that they sent SOS signals for reinforcements.
"The Sri Lankan Government realized the impending danger. The fall of Elephant Pass would be disastrous, both militarily and politically. The loss of such a strategically important base would entail the loss of territorial sovereignty of the northern region. It would mean a severe blow to the Government's cherished military strategy of taking control of Tamil areas from the Tigers. It would also be a political disaster to Premadasa's regime, since the Sinhala chauvinistic forces could not stomach such a humiliating defeat. Apart from these politico-military consequences, the most urgent and immediate task, the Government thought was to rescue the besieged troops, eight hundred in number, who had been putting up a deadly struggle for survival and pleading for immediate assistance." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers by Adele Ann Balasingham - pages 86-89
Meanwhile, the commander of the Northern forces, General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, was busy mapping out modalities to rescue the men trapped in the Elephant Pass camp. Along with Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne, General Kobbekaduwa launched "Operation Balavegaya". The Government drew up this massive operation plan with a huge force of 10,000 soldiers, which consisted of several battle-hardened and experienced regiments. They were mobilized with modern weapons, including tanks and armored vehicles.
They hit upon on an amphibious landing at Vettilaikerni. The coastal village of Vettilaikerni, located at the southern end of Point Pedro East, was to the east of Elephant Pass. This sea-borne combined operation, with the assistance of the navy and air force, was worked out in haste.
On July 14, 1991, around 5pm in the evening, the massive rescue operation was launched by General Denzil Kobbekaduwa. With Brigadier Wimalaratne's personal effort, troops landed at Vettilaikerni, located 12 kilometers east of Elephant Pass. There was so much opposition from the Tiger fighters that the first wave of naval craft failed to land. There were causalities, but men ferried by naval craft from Pulmoddai were determined and the air force provided effective air support throughout the operation.
Subsequently, thousands of Sri Lankan troops landed on the beaches of Vettilaikerni, breaching the stiff opposition provided by the Tigers. With their superior fire power and manpower, the armed forces were able to secure the beach-head and opened up a new fighting arena, and it was from here that they fought their way to relieve Elephant Pass, which had remained under LTTE siege for nearly a week. The terrain comprised of sand dunes, dotted with thorny scrub and Palmyra palms, an area that did not provide any natural cover against aerial, naval and artillery bombardment. Therefore, the confrontation assumed the character of a conventional warfare, with the combatants facing each other in open battle.
"Elsewhere Gen Kobbekaduwa was busy mapping out Operation Balavegaya to rescue the men at EPS [Elephant Pass]. Brig Vijaya Wimalaratne assisted the Gen. It was Wimalaratne's personal effort that enabled the troops to force land at Vettilaikerny to the east EPS. There was so much of opposition the first wave of naval-craft failed to land. Wimalaratne insisted, and the second wave landed amidst heavy resistance. There were casualities but the men ferried by naval craft from Pulmuddai were determined. The air force provided very effective close air support throughout this operation. Initially, troops of 3 SLLI, 3 GR, 1SLSR and 4 GR assisted by armor and artillery captured the beachhead and expanded thereafter.
"Many terrorist were killed and large stocks of arms and ammunition captured from the terrorists. There was an intense fighting near the Mulliyan Kovil, northwest of Vettilaikerni. The reason was that the terrorists were determined to recover a stock of gold hidden near the Kovil [Temple]. In fact, the terrorists managed to evict the troops from Kovil area for a short while by counter attacking. They managed to take the gold away." - A Soldier's Version by Major General Sarath Munasinghe - pages 115-116.
In the meantime, the Sri Lankan armed forces that landed at Vettilaikerni and who opened up the beach front found it extremely difficult to cross the 12 kilometers to relieve the siege of Elephant Pass base. It took nearly 18 days for them to fight their way on the 12 kilometer stretch to reach the Elephant Pass base.
According to Adele Ann Balasingham, "It took exactly 18 days for the several battalions of Sri Lankan army troops, who landed along the Vadamaradchy eastern coast in a massive rescue operation, to reach the besieged Elephant Pass base. To advance for a short distance of 12 kilometers, the Sinhala regiments, backed by heavy amour and air cover, had to engage in fierce clashes with the LTTE and fight for every inch of the land. With the heavy losses in men and material, the troops finally reached the Elephant Pass base, on the evening of 3rd August 1991. The fighting continued that area until the 9th August, when finally the LTTE made a tactical withdrawal. Apart from the battle of the Fort, it was the longest single battle ever fought between the combatants, which lasted for nearly 31 days.
"Though the LTTE suffered heavy causalities [573 Tamil Tigers were killed] in the battle, it became very obvious to the world that, the organization had built up and developed a full-fledged liberation army with highly determined and motivated fighters of both men and women, who could face up to a conventional mode of confrontation. Deprived of conventional weapon systems, adequate air defence and caught up in unfavorable terrain, the Tigers fought with sheer will power as their armor and impressed upon the enemy that, any aggressive adventure on the Tamils homeland, had to be paid for heavily with blood. Over four hundred Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and over one thousand injured in the battle of Elephant Pass." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers - page 95.
Furthermore, Adele Balasingham, writing in her The Will to Freedom, noted that, 573 Tigers were killed, including 123 women fighters. Hundreds were injured. Though it was a major military debacle, the LTTE learned through this experience the necessity and importance of developing its forces into a conventional formation. But, the most significant aspect of the battle was the unity between the LTTE and the people in preparation for and during the offensive. A major Sri Lankan military installation at the throat of Jaffna was an obvious source of resentment amongst the people. The prospect that it would be overrun and the people could move freely from the peninsula to the Vanni, exited and enthused the population." - pages 271-272.
But according to government official figures, only 202 army personnel were killed in the battle to retain Elephant Pass base. There were no official figures of the injuries sustained by the armed forces. According to Major General Sarath Munasinghe, who was at that time the Sri Lankan army spokesman, who wrote A Soldier's Version after his retirement, writes, "On 4 August 1991, I was lucky to personally witness the link up with the ESP camp. It was the biggest ever victory over the LTTE at that time. There was joy and smiles all over. Prabhakaran's much publicized, 'Mother of all Battles,' was defeated. 202 valiant men including some prominent officers had laid their lives. Over thousand terrorists were killed at EPS and during the operation to link up. Many citizens voluntarily sent in, sweets, chutney, cigarettes and many other food items to the soldiers in the battlefield. There were banners and posters praising the soldiers in many parts of the country." - pages 116-117.
Denzil Kobbekaduwa
When President Ranatunge Premadasa formed his new government in September 1989, it was expected that either Lalith Athulathmudali or Gamini Dissanayake, one of the two United National Party (UNP) stalwarts, would be made the new Prime Minister. But, to everyone's surprise, Premadasa appointed the little-known D B Wijetunga and appointed Ranjan Wijeratne - a planter by profession - as the Minister of State for Defense, a portfolio earlier held by Athulathmudali.
But, when Ranjan Wijeratne was assassinated, Srisena Coorey was appointed as the General Secretary of the UNP, the ruling party, the post, Ranjan Wijeratne had held. It was alleged that the appointment was made by Premadasa without him consulting anyone.
Athulathmudali was the Colombo district leader of the UNP, but his position was systematically undermined by the introduction of Srisena Coorey, who was entrusted with the selection of the party candidates to the Colombo Municipality Council. Thus, during the administration of Premadasa, the influence of Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake was progressively diminished.
Thereafter, these two senior members of the party were kept away from negotiations the Government had with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The so-called peace talks between Premadasa and his nominees and the LTTE delegation commenced in April 1989 and went on until the Indian army left the country on March 24, 1990.
By 1990, reports began to emerge that the LTTE was taking control of the areas in the North and Eastern provinces. Gradually, the LTTE began to gain more authority and the police had to obtain permission from the LTTE, even to leave their stations. They spent their time in their barracks, playing games and protecting themselves.
It came to the knowledge of Lalith Athulathmudali, when one Lieutenant Wathiyage contacted him around March 1991, that weapons were being transfered to the LTTE by the army in the Welioya jungles, apparently under the supervision of Colonel Bohoran, who was the head of the army camp at there. He said that he himself had delivered weapons to the LTTE. Wathiyage added that he had stayed in the LTTE camp for some time and that they had invited him to join them.
It was later learnt that Wathiyage, while delivering weapons to the LTTE, removed three T56 assault rifles and took them with him to his camp at Ambepussa, in August 1991, when he was transferred from Welioya. Later, an army officer met Wathiyage at Ambepussa, gave the numbers of the three T56 assault rifles and demanded that they be returned forthwith. Wathiyage was left with no choice, but to return them to the superior army officer. The army took no immediate action against Wathiyage, and he subsequently deserted, for fear of being exterminated by the army.
He then contacted Lalith Athulathmudali, who had helped him earlier in regard to a disciplinary action. He told Athulathmudali of the whole episode regarding the government's transfer of arms to the LTTE.
At this time, Denzil Kobbekaduwa had just returned from the army staff college in England and taken charge in Panagoda. He was popular among the Sinhalese and had been sent to the Royal College of Defense Studies in the United Kingdom, in January 1989, on a one-year course. But after a month he was recalled and sent to Kandy to deal with the Janata Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP), the Sinhalese insurgents. The British College was disturbed by this so the British High Commission in Colombo intervened and Kobbekaduwa was sent back to the UK to continue training. Subsequently he completed his course and returned to Sri Lanka.
On his return, he was attached to 1 Division, Panagoda from January 1990. On June 12, 1990 he was sent to Ampara for Eelam War 2. In July 1990, he was promoted to Major General and took over as commander of the Northern headquarters based in Anuradhapura.
In the meantime, Athulathmudali contacted Kobbekaduwa and he also met Wathiyage in Athulathmudali's house. Kobbekaduwa made discreet inquiries about the transfer of weapons to the LTTE and Gamini Dissanayake, too, joined them in getting to the bottom of the transfer of weapons. It became evident that, Athulathmudali and Kobbekaduwa were collecting evidence and making plans to expose President Ranatunge Premadasa for arming the enemy, before an international tribunal.
On March 24, 1990, the Indian army had left Sri Lanka and the LTTE managed to destroy the Tamil National Army (TNA), which was the creation of the Indian RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and that of Varatharajah Perumal, the Chief Minister of the North East Provincial Council. The LTTE took control of the Eastern province and after June 11, 1991, it was alleged that the LTTE used weapons given by Premadasa, to kill hundreds of police officers in the Eastern province.
Meanwhile, Kobbekaduwa was called in and within two weeks he was able reopen police stations in the Eastern province. Thereafter, he took over the command of Trincomalee and virtually took over as the Commander of the Northern forces, with headquarters in Anuradhapura.
Meanwhile, Athulathmudali and Kobbekaduwa were gathering facts and the information about the transfer of weapons and Gamini Dissanayake and G M Premachandra also joined in their endeavor, in March 1991. It was alleged that one Tilak Shantha, a security guard of Lalith Athulathmudali, and army private De Silva, who was supposed to be the confidante of Denzil Kobbekaduwa since 1985, had became the eyes and ears of Premadasa.
The dismissed UNP members - over the failed attempt to impeach the President - organized a new political party, the Democratic United National Front (DUNF), and Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake were made joint Presidents.
Meanwhile, Premadasa began to take steps to check on the growing popularity of Denzil Kobbekaduwa. During the siege of Jaffna Fort by the LTTE, Kobbekaduwa began an operation to relieve the siege. He submitted his plans to the army headquarters for approval. It was said that, the very evening before the proposed operation was to take place, the Observer newspaper, one of the Government-controlled English evening dailies, carried his plans for relieving the Fort. There had been a deliberate leak to ridicule and obstruct Kobbekaduwa.
On July 10, 1991, the LTTE launched a massive attack at Elephant Pass. The army base commanded by Major Sanath Karunaratne defended the camp. The battle for Elephant Pass was the most violent and bloody confrontation that ever took place between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces.
According to Adele Ann Balasingham, "For the LTTE, the Elephant Pass was a 'thorn in the neck of the Tamil Eelam', which had to be removed surgically for the physical well-being of the homeland. Since the war broke out, the LTTE fighters slowly and systematically strengthened the defense sentry positions in the northern and southern sectors of the base to prevent any offensive thrust by the Sri Lankan troops. Several attempts made by the army to break through the siege were successfully thwarted by the LTTE fighters. On the beginning of July 1991, the LTTE moved anti-aircraft guns in close proximity to the base and cut off the helicopter-borne supplies. A full fledged siege was imposed and the entire contingent of troops stationed in the base was trapped. On the 10 July 1991, LTTE assembled a massive force, consisting of several commando units of both male and female fighters and launched a major assault on the camp." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers - page 85.
Elephant Pass occupied a strategic position linking Jaffna Peninsula to the rest of the Northern mainland, the isthmus geographically shapes itself as the neck of the Tamil region.
It should be remembered that, in July 1990, when Denzil Kobbekaduwa took charge as the officer commanding the North, he instituted an operation codenamed "Operation Gajasinghe" to pull out troops from Kilinochchi and strengthen the camp at Elephant Pass. He also established a temporary camp at Paranthan, north of Paranthan junction, for obtaining fresh water for the camp at Elephant Pass.
Subsequently, Elephant Pass camp was expanded and transformed into a massive military complex, with a main base and four mini-camps, within a stretch of land three miles in diameter. At one time, the Elephant Pass base and the satellite camps covered an area about 23 kilometers long and nearly 10 kilometers wide. About 800 troops manned the military installations.
Since the beginning of Eelam War 2, the A-9 Highway - the Jaffna-Kandy road and railway links, had been cut off by the army to curtail the movements of the LTTE and to maintain a rigorous economic embargo on the population of the Jaffna peninsula.
The blockade subjected ordinary civilians to enormous and untold hardship and they were compelled to trek along the narrow and dangerous Kilali waterways of Elephant Pass lagoon.
The LTTE began its first assault on the evening of July 10, 1991, from the south of Elephant Pass. On the very first day, the LTTE captured a few bunkers held by Sri Lankan troops. The LTTE attacked Elephant Pass base by using steel plated earth moving vehicles and tractors. They fired hundreds of motor rounds on the positions of the armed forces.
On the second day, the second in command of the base, Major Lalith Buddhadasa, was killed, along with a few other soldiers, by mortar attack. Attempts by the Sri Lankan air force to land helicopters inside the base proved futile, due to the heavy gunfire of the Tigers. The LTTE by then had surrounded the army base and were closing in from all direction. The main thrust was from the south and there were attempts to penetrate the defenses with earth moving vehicles and artillery fire on the outer defense positions. But, the army, which fought valiantly, foiled all of the LTTE's attempts. Eventually, the Rest House camp in the southern sector of the base, fell into the hands of the LTTE. Sustaining heavy losses, the Sri Lankan troops fell back to the rear positions.
"Prabhakaran openly declared that, he had waged the 'Mother of all Battles'. He was very confident of victory. Troops were running short of ammunition, food and medicine. Many airdrops were carried out. Fortunately, about 60 percent of the airdrops fell within the camp premises. Troops managed with at least one cooked meal a day. This meal, prepared in different locations, included rice, dhal and either Soya meat or dried sprats." - A Soldier's Version by Major General Sarath Munasinghe - page 115.
Fierce fighting continued for four days and the LTTE forces, both male and female cadres, continued their relentless onslaught on the southern and northern sectors of Elephant Pass despite mounting causalities. The entrapped Sri Lankan soldiers fought for their lives and were completely surrounded. It was reported that they sent SOS signals for reinforcements.
"The Sri Lankan Government realized the impending danger. The fall of Elephant Pass would be disastrous, both militarily and politically. The loss of such a strategically important base would entail the loss of territorial sovereignty of the northern region. It would mean a severe blow to the Government's cherished military strategy of taking control of Tamil areas from the Tigers. It would also be a political disaster to Premadasa's regime, since the Sinhala chauvinistic forces could not stomach such a humiliating defeat. Apart from these politico-military consequences, the most urgent and immediate task, the Government thought was to rescue the besieged troops, eight hundred in number, who had been putting up a deadly struggle for survival and pleading for immediate assistance." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers by Adele Ann Balasingham - pages 86-89
Meanwhile, the commander of the Northern forces, General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, was busy mapping out modalities to rescue the men trapped in the Elephant Pass camp. Along with Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne, General Kobbekaduwa launched "Operation Balavegaya". The Government drew up this massive operation plan with a huge force of 10,000 soldiers, which consisted of several battle-hardened and experienced regiments. They were mobilized with modern weapons, including tanks and armored vehicles.
They hit upon on an amphibious landing at Vettilaikerni. The coastal village of Vettilaikerni, located at the southern end of Point Pedro East, was to the east of Elephant Pass. This sea-borne combined operation, with the assistance of the navy and air force, was worked out in haste.
On July 14, 1991, around 5pm in the evening, the massive rescue operation was launched by General Denzil Kobbekaduwa. With Brigadier Wimalaratne's personal effort, troops landed at Vettilaikerni, located 12 kilometers east of Elephant Pass. There was so much opposition from the Tiger fighters that the first wave of naval craft failed to land. There were causalities, but men ferried by naval craft from Pulmoddai were determined and the air force provided effective air support throughout the operation.
Subsequently, thousands of Sri Lankan troops landed on the beaches of Vettilaikerni, breaching the stiff opposition provided by the Tigers. With their superior fire power and manpower, the armed forces were able to secure the beach-head and opened up a new fighting arena, and it was from here that they fought their way to relieve Elephant Pass, which had remained under LTTE siege for nearly a week. The terrain comprised of sand dunes, dotted with thorny scrub and Palmyra palms, an area that did not provide any natural cover against aerial, naval and artillery bombardment. Therefore, the confrontation assumed the character of a conventional warfare, with the combatants facing each other in open battle.
"Elsewhere Gen Kobbekaduwa was busy mapping out Operation Balavegaya to rescue the men at EPS [Elephant Pass]. Brig Vijaya Wimalaratne assisted the Gen. It was Wimalaratne's personal effort that enabled the troops to force land at Vettilaikerny to the east EPS. There was so much of opposition the first wave of naval-craft failed to land. Wimalaratne insisted, and the second wave landed amidst heavy resistance. There were casualities but the men ferried by naval craft from Pulmuddai were determined. The air force provided very effective close air support throughout this operation. Initially, troops of 3 SLLI, 3 GR, 1SLSR and 4 GR assisted by armor and artillery captured the beachhead and expanded thereafter.
"Many terrorist were killed and large stocks of arms and ammunition captured from the terrorists. There was an intense fighting near the Mulliyan Kovil, northwest of Vettilaikerni. The reason was that the terrorists were determined to recover a stock of gold hidden near the Kovil [Temple]. In fact, the terrorists managed to evict the troops from Kovil area for a short while by counter attacking. They managed to take the gold away." - A Soldier's Version by Major General Sarath Munasinghe - pages 115-116.
In the meantime, the Sri Lankan armed forces that landed at Vettilaikerni and who opened up the beach front found it extremely difficult to cross the 12 kilometers to relieve the siege of Elephant Pass base. It took nearly 18 days for them to fight their way on the 12 kilometer stretch to reach the Elephant Pass base.
According to Adele Ann Balasingham, "It took exactly 18 days for the several battalions of Sri Lankan army troops, who landed along the Vadamaradchy eastern coast in a massive rescue operation, to reach the besieged Elephant Pass base. To advance for a short distance of 12 kilometers, the Sinhala regiments, backed by heavy amour and air cover, had to engage in fierce clashes with the LTTE and fight for every inch of the land. With the heavy losses in men and material, the troops finally reached the Elephant Pass base, on the evening of 3rd August 1991. The fighting continued that area until the 9th August, when finally the LTTE made a tactical withdrawal. Apart from the battle of the Fort, it was the longest single battle ever fought between the combatants, which lasted for nearly 31 days.
"Though the LTTE suffered heavy causalities [573 Tamil Tigers were killed] in the battle, it became very obvious to the world that, the organization had built up and developed a full-fledged liberation army with highly determined and motivated fighters of both men and women, who could face up to a conventional mode of confrontation. Deprived of conventional weapon systems, adequate air defence and caught up in unfavorable terrain, the Tigers fought with sheer will power as their armor and impressed upon the enemy that, any aggressive adventure on the Tamils homeland, had to be paid for heavily with blood. Over four hundred Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and over one thousand injured in the battle of Elephant Pass." - Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers - page 95.
Furthermore, Adele Balasingham, writing in her The Will to Freedom, noted that, 573 Tigers were killed, including 123 women fighters. Hundreds were injured. Though it was a major military debacle, the LTTE learned through this experience the necessity and importance of developing its forces into a conventional formation. But, the most significant aspect of the battle was the unity between the LTTE and the people in preparation for and during the offensive. A major Sri Lankan military installation at the throat of Jaffna was an obvious source of resentment amongst the people. The prospect that it would be overrun and the people could move freely from the peninsula to the Vanni, exited and enthused the population." - pages 271-272.
But according to government official figures, only 202 army personnel were killed in the battle to retain Elephant Pass base. There were no official figures of the injuries sustained by the armed forces. According to Major General Sarath Munasinghe, who was at that time the Sri Lankan army spokesman, who wrote A Soldier's Version after his retirement, writes, "On 4 August 1991, I was lucky to personally witness the link up with the ESP camp. It was the biggest ever victory over the LTTE at that time. There was joy and smiles all over. Prabhakaran's much publicized, 'Mother of all Battles,' was defeated. 202 valiant men including some prominent officers had laid their lives. Over thousand terrorists were killed at EPS and during the operation to link up. Many citizens voluntarily sent in, sweets, chutney, cigarettes and many other food items to the soldiers in the battlefield. There were banners and posters praising the soldiers in many parts of the country." - pages 116-117.
eyalata war eka witharak karanna ida hadala deela anthimata okkoma thaman kala kiyana minissunta hoda padam....
