Spat over military strategy caused Govt. crisis - Officials
*MR forwarded comprehensive dossier on LTTE line of attack to New Delhi
by Shamindra Ferdinando
Speculation in political and defence circles is that sharp differences between the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs over the government’s military strategy led to the recent stripping of Mangala Samaraweera of the foreign ministry portfolio.
Samaraweera also lost ports, aviation and shipping portfolios. An authoritative official revealed that serious differences had repeatedly surfaced at the National Security Council with the foreign ministry strongly disputing the strategy articulated by Defence Secretary Colonel (retd) Gotabhaya Rajapakse.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the official said that the foreign ministry repeatedly called for restraint on the part of the government even at the expense of national security.
The foreign ministry had wanted the defence ministry to compromise on several touchy issues including the deployment of SLAF choppers to facilitate movements of LTTE leaders.
They had also clashed over the closure of the Muhamalai gateway to the Jaffna Peninsula after the abortive LTTE attempt to overrun the army’s Jaffna frontline last August.
They had also differed on the handling of international NGOs.
Foreign ministry mandarins had claimed that the defence ministry’s actions would antagonise the international community.
Their differences had widened after President Mahinda Rajapakse authorised major ground operations in response to the growing LTTE threat, well informed sources said. Samaraweera had sided with his officials, the sources said.
The defence ministry had reacted angrily to the criticism over the disappearances of Tamil youth. The defence ministry had accused Samaraweera of endorsing the LTTE inspired accusations and criticism over disappearances and what a section of the media termed as gross human rights violations. The sources claimed that the foreign ministry gave in to the LTTE. "Suddenly we were under fire by the foreign ministry," the official said.
In fact, the President had been late in dealing with the situation, the sources said. Non-Cabinet ranker Sripathy Sooriyarachchi had sided with Samaraweera due to their close relationship, the sources said. The sources acknowledged that Sooriyarachchi had been vociferous supporter of the military action aimed at defeating the LTTE.
Like Samaraweera, Sooriyarachchi had played a critical role in facilitating Mahinda Rajapakse’s victory in the Gampaha district, at the last presidential election, in the absence of the District Leader Anura Bandaranaike who skipped the campaign.
The sources severely criticised the JVP’s decision to back Samaraweera. The sources accused the JVP of turning a blind eye to the ongoing efforts to destroy the LTTE. While calling for the termination of the CFA and all out war against the LTTE, the JVP was taking the side of Samaraweera, who stands for a Federal solution.
The President had authorised military action in response to the LTTE’s military challenge. The Island learns that Rajapakse had briefed the Indian leadership of the impending LTTE threat. The President, during his first visit to New Delhi, after assuming the presidency, had presented a dossier on the LTTE to the Indian leadership. A copy of it had been also presented to the Pakistan government. Authoritative sources said that the government made a candid assessment of the ground situation and recommended urgent steps to neutralize the threat. According to the report, if the LTTE was given a free hand it would have posed a serious threat to national security. The report had warned of a devastating strike on the Jaffna Peninsula while acknowledging that security forces would not have been in a position to thwart the offensive. The report had been with the Indians months before the LTTE made an abortive bid to cripple the strategic Trincomalee harbour in the first week of August and then struck across the Jaffna frontline from Kilaly extending up to Nagarkovil on the Vadamaratchchy East coast. The dossier also predicted that the LTTE would mount amphibious assault across the Jaffna lagoon to facilitate the ground offensive spearheaded by artillery units. "To our credit we envisaged almost the entire LTTE strategy long before the actual offensive got underway," a senior official said. According to him, the LTTE seized Mavilaru to force the government’s hand.
*MR forwarded comprehensive dossier on LTTE line of attack to New Delhi
by Shamindra Ferdinando
Speculation in political and defence circles is that sharp differences between the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs over the government’s military strategy led to the recent stripping of Mangala Samaraweera of the foreign ministry portfolio.
Samaraweera also lost ports, aviation and shipping portfolios. An authoritative official revealed that serious differences had repeatedly surfaced at the National Security Council with the foreign ministry strongly disputing the strategy articulated by Defence Secretary Colonel (retd) Gotabhaya Rajapakse.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the official said that the foreign ministry repeatedly called for restraint on the part of the government even at the expense of national security.
The foreign ministry had wanted the defence ministry to compromise on several touchy issues including the deployment of SLAF choppers to facilitate movements of LTTE leaders.
They had also clashed over the closure of the Muhamalai gateway to the Jaffna Peninsula after the abortive LTTE attempt to overrun the army’s Jaffna frontline last August.
They had also differed on the handling of international NGOs.
Foreign ministry mandarins had claimed that the defence ministry’s actions would antagonise the international community.
Their differences had widened after President Mahinda Rajapakse authorised major ground operations in response to the growing LTTE threat, well informed sources said. Samaraweera had sided with his officials, the sources said.
The defence ministry had reacted angrily to the criticism over the disappearances of Tamil youth. The defence ministry had accused Samaraweera of endorsing the LTTE inspired accusations and criticism over disappearances and what a section of the media termed as gross human rights violations. The sources claimed that the foreign ministry gave in to the LTTE. "Suddenly we were under fire by the foreign ministry," the official said.
In fact, the President had been late in dealing with the situation, the sources said. Non-Cabinet ranker Sripathy Sooriyarachchi had sided with Samaraweera due to their close relationship, the sources said. The sources acknowledged that Sooriyarachchi had been vociferous supporter of the military action aimed at defeating the LTTE.
Like Samaraweera, Sooriyarachchi had played a critical role in facilitating Mahinda Rajapakse’s victory in the Gampaha district, at the last presidential election, in the absence of the District Leader Anura Bandaranaike who skipped the campaign.
The sources severely criticised the JVP’s decision to back Samaraweera. The sources accused the JVP of turning a blind eye to the ongoing efforts to destroy the LTTE. While calling for the termination of the CFA and all out war against the LTTE, the JVP was taking the side of Samaraweera, who stands for a Federal solution.
The President had authorised military action in response to the LTTE’s military challenge. The Island learns that Rajapakse had briefed the Indian leadership of the impending LTTE threat. The President, during his first visit to New Delhi, after assuming the presidency, had presented a dossier on the LTTE to the Indian leadership. A copy of it had been also presented to the Pakistan government. Authoritative sources said that the government made a candid assessment of the ground situation and recommended urgent steps to neutralize the threat. According to the report, if the LTTE was given a free hand it would have posed a serious threat to national security. The report had warned of a devastating strike on the Jaffna Peninsula while acknowledging that security forces would not have been in a position to thwart the offensive. The report had been with the Indians months before the LTTE made an abortive bid to cripple the strategic Trincomalee harbour in the first week of August and then struck across the Jaffna frontline from Kilaly extending up to Nagarkovil on the Vadamaratchchy East coast. The dossier also predicted that the LTTE would mount amphibious assault across the Jaffna lagoon to facilitate the ground offensive spearheaded by artillery units. "To our credit we envisaged almost the entire LTTE strategy long before the actual offensive got underway," a senior official said. According to him, the LTTE seized Mavilaru to force the government’s hand.
