Sri Lanka’s UNP Govt. pledged not to get involved in Karuna-LTTE split- Norway
Tue, 2011-01-11 03:24 — editor
By Santhush Fernando in Colombo
Colombo, 11 January, (Asiantribune.com):
Erik Solheim
A highly classified diplomatic cable published by Wikileaks, reveals contrary to popular belief that the then United National Party (UNP) regime caused Karuna-LTTE split, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had promised Norwegian government that his government will not get involved in Tiger’s internal affair. “PM Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna,” US Ambassador Jeffery Lunstead reveals in his the cable dated March 15, 2004, quoting Norwegian Special Envoy Eric Solheim.
“Separately, during two meetings, Solheim said The PM also said that the government would avoid taking advantage of the situation.” However UNP high rankers, including Economic Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda, have always maintained claimed that credit for Karuna’s defection should go to UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, for engineering a split within the LTTE through the peace process whilst at the same time keeping the movement locked in via an international security net.
According to Solheim, Thamilchelvam had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to "peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed Karuna for the two recent election-related assassinations in the east.
Pathuman
The Tigers also told Solheim of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna situation. The group was steadfast that it was an "internal matter" for the LTTE alone.
According to the cable, while in the Vanni, Solheim had also met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander from Trincomalee District, in which the latter effectively rebutted recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed" him for being allegedly
PM Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna- Norwegian Special Envoy Eric Solheim.
Solheim had also said that the possibility of Karuna becoming a GSL-supported "warlord" would be the most unsettling for the peace process if it came to fruition.
Full Text Of The Cable
Date: 15.3.2004
3/15/2004 11:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 03-15-14
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT : Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous - (B) Oslo 419
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C)
SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four local co-chairs
(Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and again to a wider donor
group on March 15, Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim
discussed his latest visit to Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead
participated in the meetings. Most of Solheim´s comments
focused on the recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka´s April 2
parliamentary election. Solheim´s visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new complexities and
uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan situation. END SUMMARY.
2. (C)
MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and March 15
meetings, which were attended by Ambassador Lunstead, Solheim
said he had met with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political
chief, during a March 11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the
Vanni region. During the discussion, which centered around
rebel eastern commander Karuna´s recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam had
emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to "peacefully"
resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting that Karuna was
operating alone and that most eastern cadre were "against"
him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim that the Tigers would try to
undermine Karuna from within by starving Karuna financially
and encouraging defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also
blamed Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has placed
blame for these killings on the LTTE´s intelligence
apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim of their concern that
no one interfere in the Karuna situation. The group was
steadfast that it was an "internal matter" for the LTTE alone.
(Separately, during two meetings, Solheim said PM
Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved
in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)
3. (C)
While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he had met with
Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander from Trincomalee
District. According to Solheim, Pathuman looked "okay" and
stated that he (Pathuman) was still in command of the
Trincomalee district. (Solheim´s meeting with Pathuman
effectively rebutted recent press reports that the LTTE had
"executed" Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna
-- see Ref A.)
4. (C)
In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of Trincomalee,
Solheim said that he had had a positive meeting with Sri Lanka
Army Major General Sunil Tennekoon, the general in charge
(GOC) of the district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports to the
contrary. Local Tigers officials in Trincomalee, for their
part, told Solheim they were happy that the Norwegian
delegation was visiting Trincomalee. According to the Tigers,
the visit was an important signal that the international
community remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was
continuing its work in the east, despite press reports to the
contrary. The only change was that the SLMM was not entering
the eastern areas held by Karuna.
5. (C)
Solheim told the co-chairs that the Norwegians saw three
possible outcomes to the Karuna situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills Karuna;
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with Karuna,
giving the rebel commander autonomy over the
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to fruition.)
6. (C)
Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed donor assistance
and the need to resolve the issue of an assistance funds
delivery mechanism. To the co-chairs, Solheim stated that the
Norwegians were considering a model similar to the Afghan
Fund.
7. (C)
PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the April 2
parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that the LTTE hoped the
government would approve polling sites either at the GSL´s
crossing points into Tiger- controlled area, or in the
"no-man´s land" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On
this point, it was not clear which alternative had been agreed
to, although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army will not
honor election plans and, in a repeat of the December 2001
parliamentary elections, would largely bar Tamils in
Tiger-controlled areas from reaching polling sites. If polling
sites were approved for either of these areas, the LTTE
expected that the Army would not be present, with the Sri
Lanka police instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated that the
Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the GSL´s crossing
points. (Mission has heard reports that the Sri Lankan
Election Commissioner will support holding the polling in
"no-man´s land" areas.)
8. (C)
COMMENT: Solheim´s visit appears to have been mainly devoted
to fact gathering. Karuna´s decision to separate himself from
the main LTTE organization has clearly made the overall
situation that much more complex. Moreover, there is great
uncertainty over how the Karuna matter will play out and over
the upcoming election. That said, the Norwegians still appear
firmly engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile period,
however. END SUMMARY.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
- Asian Tribune -
Tue, 2011-01-11 03:24 — editor
By Santhush Fernando in Colombo
Colombo, 11 January, (Asiantribune.com):
A highly classified diplomatic cable published by Wikileaks, reveals contrary to popular belief that the then United National Party (UNP) regime caused Karuna-LTTE split, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had promised Norwegian government that his government will not get involved in Tiger’s internal affair. “PM Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna,” US Ambassador Jeffery Lunstead reveals in his the cable dated March 15, 2004, quoting Norwegian Special Envoy Eric Solheim.
“Separately, during two meetings, Solheim said The PM also said that the government would avoid taking advantage of the situation.” However UNP high rankers, including Economic Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda, have always maintained claimed that credit for Karuna’s defection should go to UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, for engineering a split within the LTTE through the peace process whilst at the same time keeping the movement locked in via an international security net.
What happened to Pathuman? Erik Solheim has a moral responsibility respond to this question.
During meetings held in March 13 and 15 with Ambassador Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, on March 11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region.
According to Solheim, Thamilchelvam had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to "peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed Karuna for the two recent election-related assassinations in the east.
The Tigers also told Solheim of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna situation. The group was steadfast that it was an "internal matter" for the LTTE alone.
According to the cable, while in the Vanni, Solheim had also met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander from Trincomalee District, in which the latter effectively rebutted recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed" him for being allegedly
PM Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna- Norwegian Special Envoy Eric Solheim.
Full Text Of The Cable
Date: 15.3.2004
3/15/2004 11:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 03-15-14
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT : Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous - (B) Oslo 419
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C)
SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four local co-chairs
(Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and again to a wider donor
group on March 15, Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim
discussed his latest visit to Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead
participated in the meetings. Most of Solheim´s comments
focused on the recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka´s April 2
parliamentary election. Solheim´s visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new complexities and
uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan situation. END SUMMARY.
2. (C)
MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and March 15
meetings, which were attended by Ambassador Lunstead, Solheim
said he had met with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political
chief, during a March 11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the
Vanni region. During the discussion, which centered around
rebel eastern commander Karuna´s recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam had
emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to "peacefully"
resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting that Karuna was
operating alone and that most eastern cadre were "against"
him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim that the Tigers would try to
undermine Karuna from within by starving Karuna financially
and encouraging defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also
blamed Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has placed
blame for these killings on the LTTE´s intelligence
apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim of their concern that
no one interfere in the Karuna situation. The group was
steadfast that it was an "internal matter" for the LTTE alone.
(Separately, during two meetings, Solheim said PM
Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved
in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)
3. (C)
While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he had met with
Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander from Trincomalee
District. According to Solheim, Pathuman looked "okay" and
stated that he (Pathuman) was still in command of the
Trincomalee district. (Solheim´s meeting with Pathuman
effectively rebutted recent press reports that the LTTE had
"executed" Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna
-- see Ref A.)
4. (C)
In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of Trincomalee,
Solheim said that he had had a positive meeting with Sri Lanka
Army Major General Sunil Tennekoon, the general in charge
(GOC) of the district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports to the
contrary. Local Tigers officials in Trincomalee, for their
part, told Solheim they were happy that the Norwegian
delegation was visiting Trincomalee. According to the Tigers,
the visit was an important signal that the international
community remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was
continuing its work in the east, despite press reports to the
contrary. The only change was that the SLMM was not entering
the eastern areas held by Karuna.
5. (C)
Solheim told the co-chairs that the Norwegians saw three
possible outcomes to the Karuna situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills Karuna;
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with Karuna,
giving the rebel commander autonomy over the
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to fruition.)
6. (C)
Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed donor assistance
and the need to resolve the issue of an assistance funds
delivery mechanism. To the co-chairs, Solheim stated that the
Norwegians were considering a model similar to the Afghan
Fund.
7. (C)
PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the April 2
parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that the LTTE hoped the
government would approve polling sites either at the GSL´s
crossing points into Tiger- controlled area, or in the
"no-man´s land" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On
this point, it was not clear which alternative had been agreed
to, although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army will not
honor election plans and, in a repeat of the December 2001
parliamentary elections, would largely bar Tamils in
Tiger-controlled areas from reaching polling sites. If polling
sites were approved for either of these areas, the LTTE
expected that the Army would not be present, with the Sri
Lanka police instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated that the
Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the GSL´s crossing
points. (Mission has heard reports that the Sri Lankan
Election Commissioner will support holding the polling in
"no-man´s land" areas.)
8. (C)
COMMENT: Solheim´s visit appears to have been mainly devoted
to fact gathering. Karuna´s decision to separate himself from
the main LTTE organization has clearly made the overall
situation that much more complex. Moreover, there is great
uncertainty over how the Karuna matter will play out and over
the upcoming election. That said, the Norwegians still appear
firmly engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile period,
however. END SUMMARY.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
- Asian Tribune -
