බින්දු;11039001 said:
ඔව් මොලයක් තියෙනවා. ඒක නිසා තමයි අන්ධ විශ්වාසයෙන් ඉන්නේ නැතුව ප්රශ්ණ කරන්නේ
කවුද මෙතන එරෙහිව පාවිච්චි කිරීමක් ගැන කිව්වේ?? නැට්ට පාගගෙන පෝස්ට් කරන්න එපා. මම අහන්නේ ඔහුව සර්වබලධාරියෙක් මැවීමට පුලුවන් ද කියන එකඋබේ ටෝක්ස් එකෙන් ගම්ය වෙන්නේ අලුත් සර්වබලධාරියෙක් හැදුවොත් පොර පරන සර්වබලධාරියට ගේම දාවි කියන බයෙන් හදන්න ට්රයි කරන්නේ වත් නැතුව ඉන්නවා කියන එක
මොකෙක්ද බන් ඒ සර්වබලධාරියා?? බය ගුල්ලෙක් නේ
නෑ අපි නම් දන්නේ නෑ. ඔබ එහෙම එකක් විශ්වාස කරනවා. මම නම් විශ්වාස කරන්නේ නෑ. ප්රමාණවත් හේතු සාධක නැති නිසා
සහ ඔය කියන දෙවියා ලෝකය නිර්මාණය කරා නම් පොර මහ අසම්පූර්ණ දෙයියෙක්, හරියට දෙයක් නිර්මාණය කරගන්න බැරි කෙනෙක්. සර්වබලධාරීත්වය එතනින්ම අහෝසි වෙනවා
ඇයි වැඩි දියුණු කරන්න දුන්නේ?? නිර්මාණයේ අඩුපාඩුවක් තියෙනවා නම් තමයි වැඩි දියුණු කරන්න ඕන. කම්කරුවෝ බොර තෙල් කැණලා අරගෙන දුන්නට ඒක අඩු පාඩු සහිත නිසා පිරිපහදු කරලා වැඩි දියුණු කරලා ගන්න අදාල තාක්ෂනික දැනුම සහිත අයට ලබාදෙනවා.
ඒ වගේ දෙයියන්ට හරියට ලෝකේ මවාගන්න බැරි වෙච්ච නිසා වැඩි දියුණු කරන්න අපිට බාර දුන්නද?? ඇනගත්තා නේද සර්වබලධාරියා
පී ඇස්- උඹලා වගේ උන් මොලය උඩ වාඩිවෙලා බලය පෙන්නන්න එක තමයි කොරන්නේ
හැබෑට?? කාඩ්බෝඩ් වීරකම කියන්නේ තර්ක කරන්න බැරි කෙනෙක් කොපි පේස්ට් කර කර ප්රශ්නෙන් පැනලා යන්න උත්සාහ කිරීම. කිරිස්තියානි ආගම අදහන දේව දරුවෝ නේ වැඩිම හානිකොර දේ හදලා තියෙන්නේ
අනා ගත්තේ කවුද කියලා පිට ඉදන් බලන කෙනෙක්ට තේරෙනවා
සර්වන්??ඒ මොකක්ද??
කාරුණික පුද්ගලයෙක් නම් තමන්ගේ අතේ තියෙන බලය අවනීතිය වෙනුවෙන් යොදාගන්නේ නෑ. කාරුණික පුද්ගලයා තමන්ගේ අතේ තියෙන බලය අනුන්ව පෙලන්න, අයුක්තිය ඇතිකරන්න යොදාගන්නේ නෑ. දෙවියෝ ප්රවේණික රෝග දීලා තියෙනවා නම් ඔහු කාරුණික නෑ. ඔහු තමන් සතු බලය අයථා ලෙස යොදාගෙන අනුන්ව පෙලන්න. ඔහු යුක්ති ගරුක පුද්ගලයෙකුත් නෙවෙයි.
උඹ කියන්නේ උඹේ මරිසිපුල් දෙයියා යුක්තිය ලබාදෙන්නේ නෑ කියලද??
නා ගත්තා නේද??
ප්රස්නෙන් පැනලා යන්න එපා.
අමනයා කියලා කියාගන්න එපා. කේස් එක උඹ නාගත්ත එක වුනේ
Brother I have answer all your questios ඉතින් තවදුරටත් ඕබ ඔබෙ මත්මයි ඉන්නෙ නමුත් ඕබ්ට මා සුබ පතනවා කවදා හො නිවන් අවබොද කරගන්න කියලා සමහර විට ඉට කලින් විනිස්චයට මුනුණ දෙන්න සිදුවෙවි
පිලිතුරු වලට සැහිමකට පත්විය නොහැකි නම් මට කරන්න දෙයක් නැ
මම හිතන්නෙ ඔබ මට වඩා බුද්ධිමත් ඇති ඉතින් ඔබ මෙ තර්කයෙන් දෙවියන් නැ කිලා ඔප්පු වුනනම් එ විදිහට කාටයුතු කරගෙන යන්න
මට තවත් මගෙ කලය නස්තිකරන්න බැ එක නිසා ඔබ වසන් කරපු ටික කොපි පෙට්ස් කරන්නම් පුලුවන්නම් තෙරුම් ගානිත්වා bye c u later
Proposed answers
A common response is that since God is supposedly omnipotent, the phrase "could not lift" doesn't make sense and the paradox is meaningless.[12][13] An alternative version would be to assume that a non-corporeal God cannot lift anything, but can raise it (a linguistic pedantry) - or to use the beliefs of Christians and Hindus (that there is one God, who can be manifest as several different beings) that whilst it is possible for God to do all things, it is not possible for all his incarnations to do them. As such, God could create a stone so heavy that, in one incarnation, he was unable to lift it - but would be able to do something that an incarnation that could lift it couldn't.
Isaac Asimov, a confirmed atheist, answered a variation of this question: what happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object? He points out that Albert Einstein demonstrated the equivalence of mass-energy. That is, according to relativity theory, mass is simply frozen energy, energy is simply liquid mass. In order to be either "immovable" or "irresistible", the entity must possess the majority of energy in the system. No system can have two majorities. A universe in which there exists such a thing as an irresistible force is, by definition, a universe which cannot also contain an immovable object. And a universe which contains an immovable object cannot, by definition, also contain an irresistible force. So the question is essentially meaningless: either the force is irresistible or the object is immovable, but not both. Asimov points out that this question is the logical fallacy of the pseudo-question. Just because we can string words together to form what looks like a coherent sentence doesn't mean the sentence really makes any sense.
Thomas Aquinas asserts that the paradox arises from a misunderstanding of omnipotence. He maintains that inherent contradictions and logical impossibilities do not fall under the omnipotence of God.[14] J. L Cowan sees this paradox as a reason to reject the concept of absolute omnipotence,[15] while others, such as Rene Descartes, argue that God is absolutely omnipotent, despite the problem.[9]
C. S. Lewis argues that when talking about omnipotence, referencing "a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it" is nonsense just as much as referencing "a square circle." So asking "Can God create a rock so heavy that even he cannot lift it?" is just as much nonsense as asking "Can God draw a square circle?" The logical contradiction here being God's simultaneous ability and disability in lifting the rock (the statement "God can lift this rock" must have a truth value of either true or false, it cannot possess both). Therefore the question (and therefore the perceived paradox) is meaningless. Nonsense does not suddenly acquire sense and meaning with the addition of the two words, "God can" before it. [12]
John Christian Uy said that it is just the same as someone with double-bladed sword(accidentally omnipotent), or sword and a shield(essentially omnipotent). Therefore, an accidentally omnipotent deity CAN remove it's omnipotence white an essentially omnipotent deity CANNOT do anything that would make it non-omnipotent. Both however, have no limitations so far other than the essential omnipotent being who cannot do anything which will make it non-omnipotent like making someone equal with him, lowering or improving himself(for omnipotence is the highest) etc. It could, however, make someone with a power equal to 99% of the diety's power because that created being is not equal with him. Overall, God in the Bible, is essentially omnipotent.
William Jennings Bryan said this is roughly the view espoused by Matthew Harrison Brady, a character in the 1955 play Inherit the Wind loosely based upon William Jennings Bryan. In the climactic scene of the 1960 movie version, Brady argues, "Natural law was born in the mind of the Creator. He can change it—cancel it—use it as he pleases!" But this solution merely pushes the problem back a step; one may ask whether an omnipotent being can create a stone so immutable that the being itself cannot later alter it. But a similar response can be offered to respond to this and any further steps.
In a 1955 article published in the philosophy journal Mind, J. L. Mackie attempted to resolve the paradox by distinguishing between first-order omnipotence (unlimited power to act) and second-order omnipotence (unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have).[16] An omnipotent being with both first and second-order omnipotence at a particular time might restrict its own power to act and, henceforth, cease to be omnipotent in either sense. There has been considerable philosophical dispute since Mackie, as to the best way to formulate the paradox of omnipotence in formal logic.[17]
Another common response to the omnipotence paradox is to try to define omnipotence to mean something weaker than absolute omnipotence, such as definition 3 or 4 above. The paradox can be resolved by simply stipulating that omnipotence does not require the being to have abilities which are logically impossible, but only to be able to do anything which conforms to the laws of logic. A good example of a modern defender of this line of reasoning is George Mavrodes.[5] Essentially, Mavrodes argues that it is no limitation on a being's omnipotence to say that it cannot make a round square. Such a "task" is termed by him a "pseudo-task" as it is self-contradictory and inherently nonsense. Harry Frankfurt—following from Descartes—has responded to this solution with a proposal of his own: that God can create a stone impossible to lift and also lift said stone
For why should God not be able to perform the task in question? To be sure, it is a task—the task of lifting a stone which He cannot lift—whose description is self-contradictory. But if God is supposed capable of performing one task whose description is self-contradictory—that of creating the problematic stone in the first place—why should He not be supposed capable of performing another—that of lifting the stone? After all, is there any greater trick in performing two logically impossible tasks than there is in performing one?[18]
If a being is accidentally omnipotent, then it can resolve the paradox by creating a stone which it cannot lift and thereby becoming non-omnipotent. Unlike essentially omnipotent entities, it is possible for an accidentally omnipotent being to be non-omnipotent. This raises the question, however, of whether or not the being was ever truly omnipotent, or just capable of great power.[8] On the other hand, the ability to voluntarily give up great power is often thought of as central to the notion of the Christian Incarnation.[19]
If a being is essentially omnipotent, then it can also resolve the paradox (as long as we take omnipotence not to require absolute omnipotence). The omnipotent being is essentially omnipotent, and therefore it is impossible for it to be non-omnipotent. Further, the omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible and have no limitations just like the accidentally omnipotent but the ability to make oneself non-omnipotent. The creation of a stone which the omnipotent being cannot lift would be an impossibility. The omnipotent being cannot create such a stone because it's power will be equal to him and thus, remove his omnipotence for there can only be one omnipotent being in existence, but nevertheless retains its omnipotence. This solution works even with definition 2, as long as we also know the being is essentially omnipotent rather than accidentally so. However, it is possible for non-omnipotent beings to compromise their own powers, which presents the paradox that non-omnipotent beings can do something (to themselves) which an essentially omnipotent being cannot do (to itself).
This was essentially the position taken by Augustine of Hippo in his The City of God:
For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent.[20]
Thus Augustine argued that God could not do anything or create any situation that would in effect make God not God.
Some philosophers maintain that the paradox can be resolved if the definition of omnipotence includes Descartes' view that an omnipotent being can do the logically impossible. In this scenario, the omnipotent being could create a stone which it cannot lift, but could also then lift the stone anyway. Presumably, such a being could also make the sum 2 + 2 = 5 become mathematically possible or create a square triangle. This attempt to resolve the paradox is problematic in that the definition itself forgoes logical consistency. The paradox may be solved, but at the expense of making the logic a paraconsistent logic. This might not seem like a problem if one is already committed to dialetheism or some other form of logical transcendence.
St Augustine's definition of omnipotence, i.e. that God can do and does everything that God wishes, resolves all possible paradoxes, because God, being perfectly rational, never wishes to do something that is paradoxical.
If God can do absolutely anything, then God can remove His own omnipotence. If God can remove His own omnipotence, then God can create an enormous stone, remove His own omnipotence, then not be able to lift the stone. This preserves the belief that God is omnipotent because God can create a stone that He couldn't lift. Therefore, in this theory, God would not be omnipotent while not being able to lift the stone. This is a trivial solution because, for example, an omnipotent being could create a boulder that the strongest human could not lift (it needn't do that anyway since such boulders exist) and then give itself the potency of an average human; it would then not be able to lift the stone. This solves nothing as the entity that is unable to lift the stone is not "God" as understood by the paradox, but a very average being with the same potency as a human. The solution only produces a reduced-potency "God"; it does not deal with the matter at hand: God maintaining omnipotence even while performing a task, the success or failure of which seems to imply impotence.
David Hemlock has proposed an incarnational resolution: "On one small planet, lying in a manger, one incarnate babe could not lift the rocks He had made. All the rocks of all of the starfields in Him consist, with their whirling atoms; by Him were and ever-are all things lifted up (Col 1:17; Phil 2:5-8)." [21]
